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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study is to test Ted Robert 
Gurr's relative deprivation theory of political violence. 
The basic premise of the theory is that .objective levels 
of material and social well-being do not determine men’s 
willingness to engage in violence against the state. 
Rather, it is how people view their actual attainments 
relative to their expected attainments that motivates 
them to rebel.
An assessment of Gurr’s own tests of his theory 
found the results inconclusive. His use of a multi-nation 
sample forced Gurr to measure deprivation in very general 
terms that left it unclear whether his results supported 
a relative deprivation theory, or whether they were equal­
ly consistent with a rival misery model which held objec­
tive deterioration in popular welfare to be the basis of 
civil- unrest.
In the hope of resolving this ambiguity, the 
author chose the ghetto riots which took place in the 
United States between 1964 and 1968 as the setting for 
tests of a new relative deprivation model. The strategy 
was that, by limiting attention to a single country, it 
would be possible to measure deprivation in sufficient 
detail to set it apart from alternate concepts.
Statistical tests of the new model provided strong 
evidence to refute Gurr's theory.
RELATIVE DEPRIVATION AND 
GHETTO RIOTS
INTRODUCTION
This study is an attempt to test a theory of po­
litical violence. The theory was formulated by Ted Robert 
Gurr who hypothesizes that a sense of relative deprivation 
is a necessary precondition for the occurrence of collec­
tive violence of any kind, including political violence.^ 
The basic premise of Gurr's relative deprivation argument 
is that simple or absolute losses of valued social goods 
are insufficient to motivate people to commit acts of vio­
lence. Rather, it is necessary that such losses be per­
ceived as unjustified relative to some standard of jus­
tice . It is this perception of a discrepancy between no­
tions of what people ought to have and what they do have-- 
what Gurr terms "relative deprivation"--that leads to
^"Ted Robert Gurr, "A Causal Model of Civil Strife: 
A Comparative Analysis Using New Indices," American Po­
litical Science Review, LXII (December, 1968); see also 
Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton, N.J.: Prince­
ton University Press, 1970;-and, Ted Robert Gurr with 
Charles Ruttenberg, The Condition of Civil Violence:
First Tests of a Causal Model (Princeton, N.J.: Center
For International Studies, 1967).
2.
3.
strife, and not simple declines in well-being. The links 
in the causal chain between relative deprivation and vio­
lence are the emotional states of frustration and then 
anger that flow from a sense of relative deprivation.
While Gurr asserts that the results of his own 
tests provide strong support for his theory, the manner 
in which the key concept (relative deprivation) is opera­
tionalized leads one to question this claim. Apart from 
the fact that no direct measures were used for the "state 
of mind" variables of frustration and anger, the index 
constructed for relative deprivation was based largely on 
the type of political and economic deprivations that would 
be equally appropriate for an index of absolute depriva­
tion. Hence it remains an open question as to whether 
the results cited by Gurr as providing confirmation for 
his relative deprivation model are not equally consistent 
with an absolute deprivation model.
This inconclusiveness could have been avoided if 
Gurr had specified which of three distinct types of rela­
tive deprivation models obtained in each of the 114 cases 
in his cross-national sample. At least two of the models 
are sufficiently diverse in their objectively measureable 
properties to distinguish them from absolute deprivation
4.
models; test results consistent with one of the two 
relative deprivation models could not easily be regarded 
as consistent with an absolute deprivation model. Gurr, 
however, chose not to follow this procedure, working in­
stead with the very broad index of deprivation mentioned 
above.
A need therefore exists for studies in which the 
relevant deprivation models are defined in sufficient de­
tail to set them apart from their alternatives. It is to 
meet this need that the present study was conceived. The 
study focuses on the ghetto riots which took place in the 
United States between 1964 and 1968. Based on a survey 
of conditions affecting blacks in the years prior to the 
riots, a "progressive" relative deprivation model was con­
structed and tested. A progressive model is one in which 
a steady upward improvement in objective conditions is 
the "normal" expectation; the impetus to violence comes 
when expectations of improvement are not met. With cer­
tain modifications, this model seemed most appropriate in
light of the growth in black incomes and educational at-
2
tainments in the decade prior to the riots. This 
2
The Kerner Commission pointed out that between 
1947 and 1966 the number of blacks earning an annual
5.
progressive relative deprivation model is clearly 
distinct from an absolute deprivation model, the latter 
premised on a real decline in positively valued goods and 
conditions.
In addition to relative deprivation, four other 
independent variables were defined. They were: police
department size, welfare expenditures, government expen­
ditures , and prior riots. The dependent variable was 
riot magnitude. The model was tested by means of regres­
sion analysis. Cities with a population of one-hundred- 
thousand or greater in 1950 were chosen as the units of 
analysis. Originally 169 such cities were selected. How­
ever, insufficient data on a large number necessitated 
falling back on a sample of seventy some cities in the 
final tests of the regression model.
The study is divided into three parts. The Gurr 
model is presented and its deficiencies discussed in the
income of $7,000 and over had gone from 7 percent to 28 
percent. (The National Advisory Commission on Civil Dis­
orders (Kerner Commission), Report of the National Advi­
sory Commission on Civil Disorders [New York: Bantam
Books, Inc., 1968], p. 252.) And Sears and McConahay 
noted that, while in 1940 black men aged 25 to 29 aver­
aged only 6.5 years of education, in 1962 they averaged 
11 years of schooling. (David 0. Sears and John B. 
McConahay, The Politics of Violence: The New Urban
Blacks and the Watts Riot [Boston: The Houghton Mifflin
Company, 1973], p. 19.)
6.
first chapter. In Chapter Two, the progressive depriva­
tion model thought to represent best the basis of black 
discontent is developed. In the third chapter the model 
is operationalized, and the results of the regression 
analysis are presented.
The conclusion reached is that relative depriva­
tion, as defined in this study, is not related to ghetto 
rioting.
CHAPTER I
THE GENESIS OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE
Opinions differ on the conditions that launch men 
into violent struggle against the state. Marx and Engels 
adopted the intuitively appealing view that men strike 
out at established authority after economic conditions 
have deteriorated beyond endurance. In the Communist 
Manifesto they painted a picture of the progressive mis­
ery of the industrial laborer that would be the ground­
work for the coming revolution:
The modern labourer . . . instead of rising with the
progress of industry, sinks deeper and deeper below 
the conditions of existence of his own class. He be­
comes a pauper, and pauperism developes more rapidly 
than population and wealth. . . . (A) workman is re­
stricted, almost entirely, to the means of subsistence' 
that he requires for his maintenance, and for the 
propagation of his race.
Eric Hoffer, on the other hand, doubted the capa­
city of men to rise up in anger under the weight of such
Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Manifesto of the 
Communist Party, in The Marx-Engels Reader, ed. by Robert 
C. Tucker (New York: W. W. Norton 6c Company, Inc., 1972), 
pp. 341; 345.
7.
8.
crushing burdens.
Where people toil from sunrise to sunset for a bare 
living, they nurse no grievances and dream no dreams.
. . . To be engaged in a desperate struggle for food
and shelter is to be wholly free from a sense of fu­
tility. The goals are concrete and immediate. Every 
meal is a fulfillment; to go to sleep on a full stom­
ach is a triumph; and every windfall a miracle.
Observations made by two other students of revolution sup­
port Hoffer. Alexis de Tocqueville pointed out that the 
French Revolution of 1789 was not preceded by a pattern 
of growing misery. Rather, "the French found their con­
dition the more unsupportable in proportion to its im­
provement." He went on to argue that in general, "Revo­
lutions are not always brought about by a decline from 
bad to worse . . The regime which is destroyed is al-
3
most always an improvement on its immediate predecessor." 
After his study of five revolutions, Crane Brinton came 
to a similar conslusion: "Our revolutions did not occur
2
Eric Hoffer, The True Believer (New York: Harper 
& Row, Publishers, 1966), pp. 32-33.
3Alexis de Tocqueville, The Old Regime and the 
French Revolution (New York: Harper, 1856), p. 214.
Quoted in James C. Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolu­
tion," in When Men Revolt and Why, ed. by James C. Davies 
(New York: The Free Press, 1971), p. 135.
9.
in societies undergoing widespread and long-term economic 
misery or depression."^
Although these two views appear to contradict one 
another, James Davies feels that they can be reconciled, 
"if they are juxtaposed and put in the proper time se­
quence."^ According to Davies,
Revolutions are most likely to occur when a prolonged 
period of objective economic and social development 
is followed by a short period of sharp reversal. The 
all important effect on the minds of people in a par­
ticular society is to produce, during the former per­
iod, an expectation of continued ability to satisfy 
needs--which continue to rise--and, during the latter, 
a mental state of anxiety and frustration when mani­
fest reality breaks away from anticipated reality.
The actual state of socioeconomic development is less 
significant than the expectation that past progress, 
now blocked, can and must continue in the future.
Figure 1 graphically depicts the above pattern of devel­
opments. Expressed in other terms, frustrated hope, not 
hopeless despair brings on revolution.
Davies' identification of frustration as the link 
between objective social developments and revolution, 
served as the point of departure for Ted Robert Gurr in
4
Crane Brinton, The Anatomy of Revolution (New 
York: Vintage Books, 1965), p. 29.
^Davies, When Men Revolt and Why, p. 135.
^Ibid.
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11.
the formulation of his own theory of political violence. 
Gurr builds on Davies’ work by retaining his insight that 
frustration grows out of unmet expectations, and then ex­
panding on Davies' model--commonly referred to as the 
"J-Curve" model--in three ways: First, Gurr seeks to ex­
plain all forms of political violence, not just full-scale 
revolutions. Second, Davies’ association between revolu­
tions and prior frustrations is set on a firmer footing 
by relating it to an established theory in psychology. 
Whereas Davies simply assumes that frustrations are suf­
ficient to explain revolutions, Gurr seeks justification 
for the relationship by drawing on research done by ex­
perimental psychologists on the relationship between 
frustration and violent behavior. From their work he de­
rives the concept of relative deprivation, seen by him as 
the socio-political counterpart of frustration. Relative 
deprivation stands as the key explanatory variable in 
Gurr's theory; it is proposed as a necessary precondition 
for political violence. Finally, Gurr broadens Davies' 
notion of a gap between needs and expectations to cover 
any situation in which expectations significantly exceed 
actual gratifications, not just those in which previously 
rising needs satisfactions suddenly decline relative to
12.
need expectations. Gurr's theory, in short, encompasses 
the J-Curve model, but includes other patterns of discon-
g
tent as well. Notwithstanding these differences between 
Gurr and Davies, a general argument is common to both: 
the key to explaining violent unrest is not the severity 
of social conditions, but their potential for evoking in­
tense feelings of frustration, anxiety and discontent; 
and, that potential derives from what people have rela­
tive to what they expected. Interestingly enough, Davies 
points out that Marx himself came to this conclusion in 
works written after the Communist Manifesto. In one of 
those later works Marx described the preconditions of 
widespread unrest in the following terms.
A noticeable increase in wages presupposes a rapid 
growth of productive capital. The rapid growth of 
productive capital brings about an equally rapid 
growth of wealth, luxury, social wants, social enjoy­
ments. Thus, although the enjoyments of the workers 
have risen, the social satisfaction that they give 
has fallen in comparison with the increased enjoy­
ments of the worker . . . Our desires and pleasures
spring from society; we measure them, therefore, by 
society and not by the objects which serve for their
o
Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1970), Passim, Chaps. 1-2.
13.
satisfaction. Because they are of a social nature, 
they are of a relative nature.^
Let us now take a closer look at Gurr's theory.
f
First, Gurr's definitions and explanations of the concepts 
of political violence and relative deprivation will be 
examined. Second, three models formulated by Gurr to de­
scribe how a sense of relative deprivation develops under 
particular sets of social circumstances will be discussed. 
Finally, an assessment will be made of Gurr’s efforts to 
provide empirical support for his theory through statis­
tical analysis.
Why Men Rebel: Relative Deprivation
and Political Violence
Gurr seeks to explain all forms of political vio­
lence. Taken literally, political violence could encom­
pass violence initiated by government elites and directed 
against the citizenry at large. However, Gurr excludes 
this kind of governmental violence, and limits the con­
cept of violence whose target is the "political regime":
Political violence refers to all collective attacks 
within a political community against the political
9
Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, "Wage Labour and 
Capital," Selected Works in Two Volumes (Moscow: Foreign 
Languages Publishing House, 1955), I, p. 94. Quoted in 
Davies, When Men Revolt and Why, p. 135.
14.
regime, its actors--including competing political 
groups as well as incumbents--or its policies . . .
The concept subsumes revolution, ordinarily defined 
as fundamental sociopolitical change accomplished 
through violence. It also includes guerilla wars, 
coups d ’etat, rebellions, and riots.10
Political violence is presented as a sub-set of 
collective violence, which Gurr never really defines ex­
cept to indicate that it is violence by collectivities 
directed against agents having nothing to do with the po­
litical system. Collective violence becomes political 
violence when men's "attitudes and beliefs focus it on 
* political objects, and when institutional frameworks are 
weak enough, or opposition strong enough to give the dis­
contented a sense of p o t e n c y . C o l l e c t i v e  violence in 
turn can be subsumed under aggressive behavior in general, 
whether initiated by individuals or by groups. Under 
Gurr's schema, it follows that theories which explain ag­
gression can also be used to explain collective and polit­
ical violence.
^ G u r r , Why Men Rebel, pp. 3-4. 
11Ibid., p. 155.
15.
Frustration and Aggression
There are at least three distinguishable psycho­
logical assumptions about the sources of human aggres­
sion, according to Gurr: "That aggression is solely in­
stinctive, that it is solely learned,* or that it is an
12
innate response activated by frustration." While the 
first two assumptions are not rejected entirely, Gurr 
feels that frustration theory is better supported by em­
pirical research, and therefore more persuasive.
Frustration is defined as "an interference with 
goal-directed behavior"; aggression "is behavior designed
to injure, physically or otherwise, those toward whom it 
13is directed." The link between frustration and aggres­
sion is held to be deeply rooted in man’s nature: "The
disposition to respond aggressively when frustrated is 
part of man's biological makeup; there is a biologically
inherent tendency, in men and animals, to attack the frus-
14trating agent." The basic postulate on the relation­
ship between frustration and aggression was formulated by
12Ibid., p. 31. 
13Ibid., p. 33
14Ibid.
16.
John Dollard and his colleagues at Yale in 1939. Accord­
ing to them, "the occurrence of aggressive behavior al­
ways presupposes the existance of frustration and, con-
trawise, that the existence of frustration always leads
15to some form of aggression." The second half of this 
postulate has come in for considerable attack, the coun­
terargument being that other responses to frustration be­
sides aggression are possible., including withdrawal, eva­
sion, and, in the case of children, regression in the 
form of lowered intellectual performance.
Whether these alternate responses are forthcoming 
depends on other factors which interact with frustrations. 
Leonard Berkowitz, for example, argues that the drive of 
anger, aroused by frustration, does not necessarily
lead to specific behavior (aggression in this case) 
unless there are appropriate cues or releasers.
These cues are stimuli bearing some degree of asso­
ciation with the anger instigator . . .  A frustration 
creates a predisposition to make hostile responses by 
arousing anger. Whether these responses are actually 
performed, however, depends in part upon the presence 
of suitable aggression-evoking cues.
^~*John Dollard, et_ al. , Frustration and Aggres­
sion (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1939),
p. 1.
16Leonard Berkowitz, Aggression: A Social Psycho- 
logical Analysis (New York: McGraw Hill Book Company, 
1962), p. 33.
17.
Fear is another qualifying factor. While anger predis-
«
poses people to strike out against the source of frustra­
tion, fear of the consequences may hold the attack in 
17check. Also learning can serve to inhibit aggression. 
Some may have learned to redouble their efforts in the 
face of their wishes being thwarted; others to suppress 
violent impulses because they are out of keeping with a 
moral code.
Gurr accepts the validity of these and other crit­
icisms when made in support of the proposition that ag-
18
gression is not the only possible effect of frustration. 
However, he argues that they must be put in proper per­
spective: "These findings and observations are qualifi­
cations of the basic frustration-aggression thesis, not
19refutations of it." The frustration aggression mechan­
ism remains "a motivating force that disposes men to
"^Gurr, Why Men Rebel, p. 35.
18In fact Gurr argues that the authors of the 
original Yale study made sufficiently clear in the second 
half of their work that they never intended to imply that 
aggression was the only possible response to frustration. 
Gurr, Why Men Rebel, p. 33.
19Gurr, Why Men Rebel, p. 34.
18.
20
aggression." Granted certain factors can modify the
basic impulse to aggression, their so doing does not con-
»
stitute sufficient grounds for completely disregarding 
the frustration aggression syndrome, any more than fac­
tors qualifying the law of gravity justify completely ig­
noring it. The theory of flight modifies the basic grav­
itational principle that objects immediately fall back to 
earth; objects with certain aerodynamic properties clearly 
do not. But the law of gravity is still in force since, 
in the absence of such aerodynamic properties, objects 
will behave in accord with it. So too, Gurr argues, with 
the frustration-aggression mechanism. The innate dispo­
sition to strike out at sources of frustration is subject 
to modification by men's beliefs, inhibitions, and social 
environment. This does not mean it does not exist. When
such factors are not operating, the disposition to ag-
21
gression will reassert itself.
It should be pointed out that not all the factors 
that modify aggression act to inhibit it; some, such as a 
social climate that glorifies retribution, can facilitate
^Ibid. , p . 36
21 Ibid
19.
aggression. And factors like aggressive cues, whose 
absence is cited to predict a lack of aggression, can, 
conversely, foster it when present. "Modification” 
cuts both ways. What is called for then, is the kind of 
multivariate model Gurr ultimately formulates; one which 
includes variables thought to check aggression and others 
thought to facilitate it.
Relative Deprivation
Rather than making a direct application of the 
frustration-aggression framework to political violence, 
Gurr chooses instead to work with the concept of relative 
deprivation. He defines relative deprivation as "a per­
ceived discrepancy between men’s value expectations and 
their value capabilities.” "Value expectations," are 
"the goods and conditions of life to which people believe 
they are rightfully entitled"; "value capabilities" are
"the goods and conditions they think they are capable of
22attaining or maintaining." The basis for the shift in 
concepts is partly semantical appropriateness. Apparently 
Gurr feels the frustration-aggression concepts are too 
tied to settings involving individuals only; an alternate
22 Ibid., p. 23.
20.
terminology is necessary to relate the basic frustration-
aggression dynamic to situations involving groups. He
points out that the frustration-aggression principles
operate in a wide range of individual behavior, in­
cluding the actions of those in rebellion against 
their political community. We need concepts and 
hypotheses better suited to analyzing the social and 
psychological transactions that provide the impetus 
to political violence among members of a 
collectivity. "^3
The concpets of "value capabilities" and "value expecta­
tions" seem to meet the above need for Gurr, although he 
never provides a wholly satisfying explanation for why 
this is so. Possibly it is because "values" and general 
levels of value attainments can be used more readily in 
reference to groups, than the notion of a single specific 
goal pursued by an individual. The latter is the typical 
focus in psychological studies of frustration. A second 
substantive reason for preferring the concept of relative 
deprivation is the need Gurr feels to emphasize the crit­
ical matter of perception. He provides that emphasis by 
making the distinction between a frustrating situation 
and subjective awareness of frustration, and incorporat­
ing that distinction into the definition of relative
23
Ibid., p. 36.
21.
deprivation:
A frustrating situation can be defined as one in 
which the actor is, judged by objective standards, 
thwarted by some social or physical barrier in at­
tempts to continue enjoyment of a value. The actor 
can be said to be frustrated, however, only when he 
is aware of the interference. The awareness of inter­
ference is equivalant to the concept of relative dep­
rivation as defined above.
These stipulations should not, however, obscure 
the intimate relationship between relative deprivation 
and the frustration-aggression dynamic. Once the percep­
tion of a discrepancy between value expectations and capa­
bilities takes place, it is the basic frustration- 
aggression mechanism which is engaged to provide the "ba­
sic motivational link between RD [relative deprivation]
25and the potential for collective violence."
Patterns of Relative Deprivation 
Gurr isolates two sets of conditions which give 
rise to relative deprivation. First, "societal conditions 
that increase the average level or intensity of expecta­
tions without increasing capabilities increase the
24
Ted Robert Gurr with Charles Ruttenberg, The 
Conditions of Civil Violence: First Tests of a Causal
Model (Princeton, N.J.: Center for International Studies, 
1967), p. 4.
25
Gurr, Why Men Rebel, p . 36.
22
2 6
intensity of discontent.11 This type of situation
brings on what Gurr terms "aspirational deprivation,11 and 
is illustrated in Figure 2. "The value gains of other 
groups and the promise of new opportunities" are two gen­
eral conditions that give rise to aspirational depriva-
27tion, according to Gurr. One would expect to find it 
in fairly traditional societies suddenly exposed to new 
ways of life through modern communications media, or, in 
some cases through exposure to foreign cultures encount­
ered in the course of wartime service in the army of a
28colonial ruler.
A second pattern of relative deprivation stems 
from a decrease in value capabilities without a corres­
ponding decrease in expectations:
Societal conditions that decrease men's average 
value position without decreasing their value 
expectations similarly increase deprivation, and 
hence the intensity of discontent.29
This is called "decremental deprivation" and is depicted
^Ibid. , p. 13
27Ibid.
2^Ibid., p . 51 
29
*Ibid., p. 13
23.
High
Collective
Value
Position
/
Value Expectations
/
      ./
Value Capabilities
Low Time
30Fig. 2.--Aspirational Deprivation
30Ibid., p. 51. See also Daniel Lerner, The Pass­
ing of Traditional Society: Modernizing in the Middle
East (New York: The Free Press, 1958) for a good discus­
sion on the genesis of aspirations in the modern era.
24.
in Figure 3. In general terms, it can result from, "the
inflexibility of value stocks in a society, short-term
deteriorations in a groups' conditions of life, and limi-
31tations on its structural opportunities." Examples of 
decremental deprivation would be the loss of influence by 
elite groups or the decline in the status of middle class 
groups relative to working classes. In its most severe 
form it would be found in traditional societies in the 
wake of natural catastrophes--floods, earthquakes, and 
the like. Such societies typically lack the capacity to 
bounce back possessed by modern industrial countries.
The third type of deprivation, "progressive dep­
rivation," is identical to the Davies J-Curve model pre­
sented earlier. As shown in Figure 4, it contains ele­
ments of the aspirational and decremental patterns in that 
value expectations go up and capabilities drop off rela­
tive to expectations. However, in this case capabilities 
initially keep pace with rising expectations before the 
decline sets in. One would expect transitional societies 
with transitional groups in them to be especially prone 
to progressive deprivation. Polities of this type have
31Gurr, Why Men Rebel, p. 47.
High
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Low Time
Fig. 3.--Decremental Deprivation
26.
High
Value Expectations
Value Capabilities
Low
Time
Fig. 4.--Progressive Deprivation
33Ibid., p. 53.
27.
achieved some type of 'take-off1 but have not yet 
developed a set of sufficiently stable institutions to 
insure sustained growth.
Each of these three models is in contrast to the 
absolute deprivation or misery model put forth by Marx 
and Engels in their earlier writings. The misery model 
would be Gurr1s decremental deprivation model minus 
the expectations (see Figiire 5) . The misery model goes 
against the basic premise common to all three of Gurr1s 
relative deprivation models: discontent is relative to
expectations; or, borrowing from Hoffer, is born of the 
capacity of men to dream dreams. In line with this Gurr 
posits that, other factors to be discussed later being 
equal, the greater the discrepancy between value expecta­
tions and capabilities, the greater the potential for
34political violence.
Ibid., Passim, chaps. 2-3.
28.
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Fig. 5.--Misery Model
29.
Empirical Support
Gurr has made two major tests of his relative
35 36
deprivation model--one in 1966, the other in 1968.
Results of the latter test were published in the American 
Political Science Review in December of 1968. The results 
of both tests were cited in support of propositions dis­
cussed at much greater length in Why Men Rebel, Gurr1s 
most comprehensive statement of his theory published in 
1970. However, since the model in the 1968 study is pre­
sented by Gurr as an improvement over the model in the 
earlier study, the analysis to follow will be addressed 
to the 1968 findings.
In accord with Gurr1s acknowledgement that other 
variables interact with a deprivation-induced impulse to 
aggression, his 1968 study contained a multivariate re­
gression model with five other independent variables be­
side deprivation. The other independent variables were 
labeled institutionalization, legitimacy, coercive
35Gurr with Ruttenberg, Conditions of Civil
Violence.
Ted Robert Gurr, "A Causal Model of Civil 
Strife: A Comparative Analysis Using New Indices," Amer­
ican Political Science Review, LXII (December, 1968), 
pp. 1104-1124.
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potential, facilitation, and past strife; the dependent 
variable was civil strife. The model, along with the re­
sults of the regression analysis is presented in Figure
6 . The figures at the top of each cell are the 
2
simple r between the variable and civil strife, i.e., 
the proportion of variation in the measure of strife 
accounted for by each independent variable separately. 
The percentages are the proportion of explained var­
iance accounted for by each variable when the effects
37of all others are controlled. '
For present purposes an extended explanation of the ar­
rows is not necessary except to say that the arrows indi­
cate the direction of causal relationships either between 
the independent variables and civil strife, or among the 
independent variables; pluses and minuses indicate whether 
the relationships are positive or negative.
Coercive potential is based on the simple size of 
coercive forces at the disposal of the government, sup­
plemented by measures of the loyalty of such forces. The 
underlying causal proposition behind the coercive poten- 
tial variable is as follows: The relationship between
the simple size of coercive forces at the disposal of the 
regime and the level of strife perpetrated by aggrieved
37Ibid., p. 1121.
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citizens striking out at the regime is held to be 
curvilinear. This is depicted in Figure 7.
The curvilinear nature of the relationship derives 
from changes in the relative impact of anger and fear as 
coercive force size increases. Initially, at low to mod­
erate levels of coercion, anger is proposed as the domi­
nant emotion. Coercion at these states does nothing to 
relieve anger spawned by deprivations. What it does do 
is add to it. People are more angry at having their ex­
pression of grievances interfered with, than they are 
fearful of the consequences of such expression, and this 
is reflected in a steady climb in civil strife levels up 
to the mid-ranges of coercive force size. Past that 
point, the pattern is reversed, as fear begins to over­
ride anger with each increment in coercion. Gurr accepts 
the validity of this relationship, but argues that when 
the loyalty of the regime’s armed forces is taken into 
account, the curvilinear pattern will be replaced by a
negative linear relationship. The results of Gurr1s em-
39
pirical analysis support both hypotheses.
39Ibid., p. 1118.
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Institutionalization refers to, "the extent to
which societal structures beyond the primary level are
broad in scope, command substantial resources and/or per-
41sonnel, and are stable and persisting.” It is mani­
fested through the existence of groups such as labor un­
ions and political parties which can operate to "minimize
42violent economically-based conflict." This conflict
reducing effect is based on two psychological processes:
One is that the existence of such structures increases 
men’s value opportunities, i.e., their repertory of 
alternative ways to attain value satisfaction. A 
complementary function is that of displacement: la­
bor unions, political parties, and a range of other 
associations may provide the discontented with rou- 
tinized and typically non-violent means for expres­
sing their discontents.^
Facilitation represents social and environmental condi­
tions that may "facilitate the outbreak and existence of 
44strife." Gurr operationalizes facilitation by measure­
ments of "past levels of civil strife," and "social and 
structural facilitation per se." The theoretical basis
Ibid., p. 1105
42T,Ibid.
43Ibid.
44Ibid., p. 1106.
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for the former is that ’’populations in which strife is
chronic tend to develop, by an interaction process, a set
45of beliefs justifying violent responses to deprivation.” 
Social and structural facilitation correspond to organi­
zational and physical environmental conditions which make 
it easier for aggrieved parties to mount and sustain armed 
attacks on the government. Gurr uses the relative 
strength of the Communist Party to measure the organiza­
tional component of facilitation, the idea being that il­
legal parties such as the Communist Party "are more fa- 
cilitative of strife because their membership is likely, 
because of the exigencies of repression, to be more dedi­
cated, better organized, and committed to the more violent
46forms of conflict.” Polities in which such parties are 
able to exist, therefore, should be characterized by a 
higher level of violence. The structural component of 
facilitation relates to the terrain and transportation 
networks of a country. Countries with rugged terrain and 
poorly developed transportation systems provide rebels
46Ibid., p. 1114.
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with inaccessible strongholds from which they can sustain
47an insurrection.
The final variable in the model, legitimacy, is 
included on the assumption that people are more willing 
to comply with the directives of a government, notwith­
standing the existence of deprivations, if the government 
is possessed of a certain moral rectitude. To the extent 
that a government is seen in this light the level of 
strife should be lower for any given level of frustration 
Gurr operationalizes legitimacy by measuring the extent 
to which governmental institutions are "native" to the 
society (i.e., not imposed by some foreign power as in 
the case of a colonial regime), and the length of time
over which such institutions have survived intact without
48
substantial reform.
The dependent variable, civil strife, is defined
as "all collective, nongovernmental attacks on persons or
property that occur within the boundaries of an autono-
49mous or colonial political unit." By "nongovernmental"
47 Ibid.
48Ibid., p. 1115.
49 Ibi'd. , p. 1107. This definition is similar to, 
but not identical to the definition of "political
37.
Gurr means "acts by subjects and citizens who are not 
employees or agents of the regime, as well as acts of 
such employees or agents contrary to role norms, such as 
mutinies and coups d'etat."^
Finally there is the deprivation variable. It 
has been considered last because it will be singled out 
for close scrutiny. As Figure 6 indicates, Gurr divides 
it into short-term deprivation and persisting deprivation. 
Persisting deprivation represents deprivation over the 
long, but not very long run. As Gurr introduces the 
variable,
violence" given earlier. It differs in that, on the basis 
of the definition alone, it is not quite clear if Gurr is 
talking about violence aimed at the political regime, or 
some diffuse form of violence that happens to occur with­
in the political borders of the regime. However, the re­
mainder of Gurr1s study makes it clear that he is refer­
ring to violence targeted to against the regime. His in­
clusion of legitimacy, for example, in the class of vari­
ables determining civil strife indicates this. The cau­
sal proposition associated with legitimacy is that, other 
things.being equal, people will decide to engage or not 
engage in violence according to the moral rectitude of 
the regime. This implies that the regime is already 
marked off as the appropriate focal point of violence be­
cause it is held responsible for deprivations. The only 
question is whether people will be willing to endure dep­
rivations and forgo attacks on the regime in light of its 
moral qualities.
38.
In the very long run men's expectations about the 
goods and conditions of life to which they are en­
titled tend to adjust to what they are capable of at­
taining. In the shorter span, however, some groups 
may persistently demand and expect values, such as 
greater economic opportunity, political autonomy, or 
freedom of religious expression that their societies 
cannot provide.51
Since the indices used to measure persisting deprivation 
as well as short-term deprivation will play a very large 
part in our assessment of Gurr's model, they will be re­
produced here almost in full. Gurr measured persisting 
deprivation in terms of the following factors:
(1) Economic discrimination is defined as systematic 
exclusion of social groups from higher economic value 
positions on ascriptive bases. For each polity the 
proportion of population so discriminated against, if 
any, was specified to the nearest .05, and the inten­
sity of deprivation coded on a four point scale .
(2) Political discrimination is similarly defined in 
terms of systematic limitation in form, norm, or prac­
tice of social groups' opportunities to participate
in political activities or to attain elite positions 
on the basis of ascribed characteristics. Proportion­
ality and intensity scores were determined and com­
bined in the same manner as economic discrimination 
scores.
(3) Potential separatism was indexed by multiplying 
the proportional size of historically-separatist re­
gional or ethnic groups by a four-point intensity 
measure.
(4) Dependence on private foreign capital, indexed by 
negative net factor payments abroad as a percentage
Ibid., p. 1109.
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of Gross Domestic Product in the late 1950's, is 
assumed to be a chronic source of dissatisfaction in 
an era characterized by economic nationalism. The 
greater the *porportion of national product that ac­
crues to foreign suppliers of goods or capital, the 
greater the inferred intensity of deprivation . . .
(5) Religious cleavages are a chronic source of dep­
rivation-inducing conflict. The scale for intensity 
of religious cleavage takes account both of number of 
organized religious groups with two percent or more 
of total population . . . and of the duration of
their coexistence, the greater that duration the less 
the inferred intensity
(6) Lack of educational opportunity was indexed, in 
proportionality terms only, by subtracting primary 
plus secondary school enrollment ratios ca. 1960 from 
100. Education is so widely regarded as an essential 
first step in individual socio-economic advancement 
that one can infer deprivation among the uneducated, 
and among the parents of children who cannot attend 
school if not yet among the children themselves. ^ 2
Justification for inclusion of the short-term dep­
rivation was made in the following terms:
Any sharp increase in peoples' expectations that is 
unaccompanied by the perception of an increase in 
value capabilities, or any abrupt limitation on what 
they have or can hope to obtain, constitute relative 
deprivation. We inferred that short-term, relative 
declines in system economic and political performance 
were likely to be perceived as increased deprivation 
for substantial numbers of people.^3
Short-term deprivation was measured in terms of the fol­
lowing indices:
52Ibid., pp. 1109-1110.
53Ibid., p. 1110.
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(1) Short-term trends in trade value, 1957 compared 
with 1950-57 : The percentage change of trade value,
exports + imports, for 1957-60 was compared with the 
rate for 1950-57, and any relative decrease in the 
later period was treated as an indicator of short­
term deprivation .
(2) Short-term trends in trade value, 1960-63 compared 
with 1950-60: Procedures identical with (1), above,
were used . . .
(3) Inflation 1960-63 compared with 1958-61: Data on
cost-of-living indices were scaled and combined in 
such a way that the highest deprivation scores were 
assigned to polities with substantial and worsening 
inflation in the 1958-63 period .
(4) 1960-63 GNP growth rates compared with 1950's 
growth rate: Economic growth rate data were scaled
so that polities having low rates in the 1950's and 
even lower rated in the early 1960's received the 
highest deprivation scores; those with moderate rates 
in the 1950's but substantial relative decline in the 
early 1960's received somewhat lower deprivation 
scores; and those with a steady high, or moderate but 
steadily increasing, rates received zero deprivation 
scores.
(5) Adverse economic conditions 1960-63: . To supple­
ment aggregate data indicators of economic depriva­
tion, several summary news sources were searched for 
evaluative statements about adverse internal economic 
conditions such as crop failures, unemployment, ex­
port market slumps, drought, etc. .
(6) New restrictions on political participation and 
representation by the regime were coded from the same 
sources (as above) for the same years.
Ibid., p. 1111.
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Problems : Relative Deprivation?
Using regression analysis Gurr constructed a cau­
sal model made up of the variables presented above. The 
model was aimed at explaining strife levels in 114 coun­
tries during the 1961-65 period. On the basis of the re­
sults of his analysis, presented in Figure 6, Gurr con­
cluded that "the fundamental proposition that strife var­
ies directly in magnitude with the intensity of relative
deprivation is strongly supported . ." The deprivation
2
variables, "provide an R of .60 (R = .36)." Hence, "the
basic proposition of this study, that relative deprivation
55is a necessary precondition for strife," remains intact. 
The question is, does it really? Do Gurr's results, im­
pressive at first glance, clearly sustain his conclusion 
that relative deprivation is a necessary condition for 
strife?
Anticipating criticism, Gurr himself outlined the
basis on which his conclusions might be challenged:
(T)here is only one scientifically acceptable alter­
native to regarding the results reported here as 
strong . . . evidence for the psychological proposi­
tions relating relative deprivation . . .  to civil 
violence. That is to provide some reasonably
55Ibid., pp. 1122-1123.
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parsimonious, alternative explanations (substantive 
or technical). . .  * °
The question becomes then, does a reasonably parsimonious 
alternative explanation of Gurr's results exist? I would 
argue that, owing to the manner in which Gurr used his in­
ferential measures of deprivation, it does; that in light 
of Gurr1s procedures for measuring deprivation, the kind 
of simple misery model offered by Marx and Engels in early 
writings is such an alternative. The latter is an alter­
native in the sense of being distinct from Gurr1s thesis 
because it defines deprivation in terms of sheer material 
needs, making no reference to expectations. For this 
very reason the misery model has greater parsimony: with
no reference to thwarted expectations recourse to 
frustration-aggression theory--something Gurr spends a 
good deal of time on--becomes unnecessary. And, espe­
cially important, it can be shown to be an alternative in 
that it is consistent with the results Gurr cites in de­
fense of the relative deprivation thesis.
As a glance at Gurr1s indices of deprivation will 
show, Gurr did not measure relative deprivation--or at 
least not directly measure it. Relative deprivation is a
56Ibid., p. 1123.
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state of mind. To measure it directly Gurr would have 
needed surveys in which people were questioned about their 
expectations, and on whether they perceived a discrepancy 
between their value expectations and value capabilities. 
Instead Gurr relied on indirect or inferential measures. 
That is, on the basis of direct measures of objective 
levels of economic goods, political and religious free­
dom, etc., Gurr inferred that people would feel a sense 
of deprivation relative to some unspecified and unmeasured 
set of expectations. Gurr, of course, did this quite 
openly, explicitly stating, for example, in the course of 
defining short-term deprivation, that, "we inferred that 
short-term, relative declines in system economic and poli­
tical performance were likely to be pe'rceived as increased
57deprivation . . ."; or, in the case of one of his per­
sisting deprivation indices, saying that, the greater the
reliance on foreign capital, "the greater the inferred
58
intensity of deprivation" (emphasis added). Also he 
does it with full awareness, noting that, "the results 
are not a ’direct1 test of the relevance of such
57Ibid., p. 1110.
58Ibid.
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variables, since the indices of psychological variables
are derived from aggregate data rather than being obtain-
59ed . from cross-national surveys.’1 And in itself,
his use of inferential measures cannot be condemned. In­
ferential measures are quite common in social science re­
search, and they are quite legitimate' according to the
canons of scientific methodology as laid out in standard
60texts on the subject. However, the manner in which 
Gurr used inferential measures in this particular case 
made his results inconclusive.
Rather than designing indicators to reflect the 
three patterns of relative deprivation presented earlier-- 
the aspirational, progressive, and decremental patterns, 
Gurr chose instead to use indices apparently intended to 
capture no pattern in particular. There is no mention 
anywhere of these three patterns. If the indices reflect 
a particular pattern it would have to be the decremental 
pattern. The persisting deprivation indicators seem to 
measure long-term declines; the short-term, short-term
59Ibid., p. 1123.
See, for example, Adam Przeworski and Henry 
Teune, The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry (New York: 
John Wiley & Sons, 1970), pp. 97-106.
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declines. This is unfortunate because the decremental 
pattern comes closes.t to the very model we have identified 
as an alternative to the relative deprivation model--the 
misery model. As a consequence, legitimate questions 
arise that weaken Gurr’s conclusion. What did Gurr mea­
sure? Did he measure relative deprivation, or can his 
measures be regarded with equal validity as measures of 
absolute deprivation--!.e ., misery? Without survey data,
I would argue that they can. Ultimately then, we have two 
distinct explanations, each consistent with Gurr's re­
sults, and those results, therefore, are theoretically 
inconclusive.
This problem need not have arisen because it does 
not stem directly from the use of inferential measures.
If Gurr had stuck to inferential measures but employed 
them in such a way as to reflect particular patterns of 
development of deprivation, he might have avoided the in­
conclusiveness that plagues his results. Even without 
direct attitude surveys to corroborate states of mind,
* the progressive and aspirational patterns possess proper- * 
ties that distinguish them from-the misery model. The 
progressive pattern consists in part of a steady rise in 
value capabilities. Certainly in the case of objectively
46.
measureable variables such as cost of living, income, 
educational attainments, etc., this can be measured with 
aggregate data. The unchanged, horizontal level of capa­
bilities associated with the aspirational pattern can be 
similarly measured. In each case they can easily be dis­
tinguished from the misery pattern of progressive decline 
solely on the basis of aggregate indices of empirical 
phenomena.
Gurr may have failed to distinguish between pat­
terns because, as of the 1968 study, he had not yet de­
veloped the scheme of three distinguishable ways in which 
relative deprivation could•develop. The latter was pre­
sented in Why Men Rebel, written in 1970. Or, even if 
these schemes had taken shape by 1968, he may not have 
wanted to use it because it would have entailed subdivid­
ing his 114 nation sample into three separate categories. 
Much more research on each country would have been neces­
sary to do this. Also, in the event one or two of the 
categories contained only a few countries, reduced sample 
sizes might have made it difficult to establish statisti­
cal significance. But, whatever his reasons, working only 
with indices of some type of general deprivation--which 
in fact ended up looking like decremental deprivation,
47.
made Gurr's results inconclusive. Consequently, the 
relative deprivation thesis has yet to receive strong and 
clear empirical support.
Summary and Conclusions 
The foregoing remarks have been made not so much 
to criticize Gurr, as to establish the framework for the 
present study. The question posed at the outset of this 
chapter unfortunately still remains an open one: Does
political violence spring from the abject misery of phys­
ical environments as men, pushed to the precipice of sub­
sistence, lash out at authorities; or, is it born in the
/
gaps men see between expectations and attainments; less 
an affair of external, material need than internal, psy­
chological wants? Gurr fell far short of providing a 
clear and convincing answer. .The means he used to measure 
deprivation made it difficult to distinguish between rela­
tive wants and sheer desperation.
What is needed, therefore, are studies in which 
the specific pattern of relative deprivation is estab­
lished for each individual case. At least in cases in 
which objectively measureable material conditions either 
remained static or improved, tests of statistical models
48.
built around these patterns should furnish a good basis 
for deciding between the relative deprivation and misery 
theses— even without direct psychological measures.
The present study is designed to meet this need. 
The United States has been selected as a setting for 
testing a single relative deprivation model. During the 
years from 1964 to 1968 a wave of rioting broke out in 
black urban ghettos in cities throughout the United 
States. What I propose to do is investigate conditions 
prior to the rioting to establish which of the three rel­
ative deprivation patterns best characterizes the growth 
of black discontent. A regression model appropriate for 
this pattern will then be constructed and tested. The 
hope is that by proceeding on a case-by-case basis fur­
ther light can be shed on the genesis of political 
violence.
CHAPTER II
GHETTO TURMOIL IN THE UNITED STATES
Throughout the night of July 22, 1967 reports of 
sniper fire had been pouring into the Detroit police head­
quarters. A short distance from headquarters Mrs. Helen 
Hall was staying at the Harlan House Hotel. Her curio­
sity having been aroused by noises outside, she peered 
through a hall window on the fourth floor. ’’Look at the 
tanks," she called out to the other guests. Seconds la­
ter, she died as .50 caliber bullets from those tanks be­
gan slamming into the building.'*' Around midnight Sharon 
George, a 23 year old white woman, was a passenger in a 
car along with her husband and two brothers. They drop­
ped off two Negro friends and then started returning 
home. Their automobile was soon slowed by a crowd mill­
ing in the street. A shot fired at close range struck
The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disor­
ders (Kerner Commission), Report of the National Advisory 
Commission on Civil Disorders (New York: Bantam Books,
Inc., 1968), p . 102.
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the car. Sharon Goerge died within two hours. In 
Newark, at about eight o'clock on the night of July 12, 
1967, Mrs. L. M . , her husband, their five sons, and Mr.
M's brother were returning home from dinner in a restau­
rant. Mr. M . , who was driving, panicked as he approached 
a National Guard roadblock. He slowed the car, then 
swerved around. A shot rang out. When they reached home 
the family began piling out of the car. Ten year Eddie 
failed to move. He had died from a bullet wound in the 
head.^
•These incidents are but three pieces of a recur­
ring nightmare that haunted America during the I960's.
From 1964 to 1968, on some 300 to 400 different occasions, 
violence by blacks in cities across the country shattered 
what remained of the myth of black contentment. The first 
question is, what happened?
Roman Holiday or Revolution?
Some said not much happened; not really. The 
riots did not have to be taken too seriously because they 
did not amount to a serious social protest, an attempt to
2Ibid.
Ibid., p . 94.
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challenge the legitimacy of existing institutions. This
was the thesis advanced by the McCone Commission, a group
of civic and business leaders appointed by Governor Brown
of California to investigate the Watts riots in 1964.^
David Sears and John McConahay summarize the findings of
that commission as folTows:
After (1) labeling the riot an 'insensate rage of de­
struction, 1 the commission proposed that (2) partici­
pants were a small fraction of the ghetto (2 percent 
or 10,000 persons) who were marginally related to the 
ghetto community, as drifters (principally criminals), 
unemployed, and dropouts from the educational system, 
and that (3) participants were newcomers to Los An­
geles from the South who had been attracted by Cali­
fornia 's liberal welfare policies and who turned to 
violence when the expectations they brought with them 
were not fulfilled.
If this is true, if the participants were no more 
than "a senseless mob, riffraff," or freeloading southern 
newcomers, then the riots were devoid of any political 
significance. They could be relegated to the status of
Governor's Commission on the Los Angeles Riots 
(McCone Commission), Violence in the city--an end or a 
beginning? (Los Angeles: 1965).
^David 0. Sears and John B. McConahay, The Poli­
tics of Violence: The New Urban- Blacks and the Watts
Riot (Boston: The Houghton Mifflin Company, 1973), p.
19. See also Governor's Commission, Violence in the 
city, pp. 1, 4-6, 24, and 71.
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the ’’irrational and pathological” ; a "Roman Holiday” of 
violence that provided some sort of'emotional release.^ 
And the problems they represented, "were not the collec­
tive problems of a large black community living in a pre­
dominantly white society riddled with racism; they were 
merely the individual peculiarities of a few deviant and
g
uncivilized troublemakers.”
This point is important as it is central to the 
purposes of the study. If we are dealing with the patho­
logical disorders of a small number of deviant individu­
als, then it is pointless to use the riots to test a the­
ory purporting to explain civil unrest in terms of general 
social conditions. In this case the riots are best left 
to the clinical psychologists or criminologists. On the 
other hand, if the riots were perpetrated by a fair num­
ber of average citizens whose conduct grew out of
Sears and McConahay, The Politics of Violence,
p. 19.
^Louis H. Masotti and Don R. Bowen, ’’Civil Vio­
lence: A Theoretical Overview,” in Riots and Rebellion,
ed. by Louis H. Masotti and Don R. Bowen (Beverly Hills, 
Calif.: Sage Publications, Inc., 1968), p. 16.
g
Sears and McConahay, The Politics of Violence,
p. 19.
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grievances related to the social circumstances in which 
they lived, then a study of these circumstances makes 
sense.
It might be pointed out that Gurr considers riots 
in general as manisfestations of political unrest. They 
are placed into one of three broad categories of political 
violence, "turmoil,11 "conspiracy," and "internal war." 
"Turmoil," is defined as "relatively spontaneous, unor­
ganized political violence with substantial popular par­
ticipation, including violent political strikes, riots,
9political clashes, and localized rebellions." And it is 
clear throughout his book that he regards the ghetto riots 
in the United States in particular as appropriate objects 
for explanation by his theory of political violence.^
9
Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton, N.J.:
• Princeton University Press, 1970), p. 11. Gurr defines 
."conspiracy" as "highly organized political violence with 
limited participation, including organized political as­
sassinations, small-scale terrorism, small-scale guerilla 
wars, coups d'etat, and mutinies." "Internal war" is de­
fined as "highly organized political violence with wide­
spread popular participation, designed to overthrow the 
regime or dissolve the state and accompanied by extensive 
violence, including large-scale terrorism and guerilla 
wars, civil wars, and revolutions."
10Ibid., pp. 99, 167, 169, 172-173, 183-184, 197, 
226-227, and 290.
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However, Gurr makes no systematic attempt to justify his 
treatment; that is, to take up the specific question of 
whether U.S. ghetto riots are political violence and dem­
onstrate that they meet his own criteria of being (1) col­
lective violence (i.e., violence by relatively large num­
bers of people, and (2) a political form of collective 
violence by reason of striking against the political re­
gime in some way. So in light of Gurr's ambiguity on this 
point, as well as the "riffraff theory" offfered by the 
McCone Commission, the question of whether the riots were 
the pathological outbursts of a few social misfits or 
genuine political phenomena should be taken up.
Evidence gathered from various sources may be 
seen* to support the political interpretation. The Kerner 
Commission found that 11 percent of the riot area resi­
dents in Detroit and 45 percent of ghetto inhabitants in 
Newark were self-reported rioters, which diminishes our
confidence in the argument that only a miniscule portion
11
of those communities took part. Similarly, a survey 
conducted by T. M. Tomlinson and David Sears disclosed 
that 15 percent of the curfew area residents in Los
11Kerner Commission, Report of Disorders, p. 7.
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Angeles participated in the Watts riot. Moreover, apart
from actual participation, the same authors found that
the conduct of the rioters was not inconsistent with the
sentiment of a larger segment of the community that did
not take part in the riot. They report that 30 percent
selected "very or somewhat favorable" to describe their
feelings toward the rioters, 19 percent "ambivalent or
neutral," and 42 percent "strongly or moderately 
12
unfavorable."
Nor does it appear that the rioters were itiner­
ant drifters and trouble-makers from outside the region.
A survey by the Kerner Commission found that 74.4 percent 
of the rioters in Detroit and 74 percent of those in 
Newark were brought up in the North. Further, data gath­
ered by the commission on five cities which experienced 
riots revealed that 63 percent of the arrestees were born 
in the same region in which the riot took place. The com­
mission summed up its views on this question by pointing 
out that, "Rioters are not only more likely than the non­
involved to have been born in the North, but they are
12T. M. Tomlinson and David 0. Sears, "Riot Ide­
ology in Los Angeles: A Study of Negro Attitudes," in
Black Revolt, ed. by James A. Geschwender (Englewood 
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., p. 375.
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also more likely to have been long-term residents of the
13city in which the disturbance took place."
The rioters themselves*, then, do not appear to 
have been negligible in number nor atypical of their com­
munities. To the extent that the McCone Commission thesis 
hangs on demonstrating that they were, it must be reject­
ed. But can one go so far as to say the riots were a 
form of political violence? Two analysts of the riots, 
Louis Masotti and Don Bowen, approach this issue in a 
fashion similar to Gurr. They argue that determining the 
nature of the riots comes down to a matter of intended 
targets. What distinguishes political violence from oth­
er types of violence, such as family feuding and criminal 
activity, "is the intent of those engaged in it to strike 
out at the animate or inanimate representatives of the 
civil order. Such intent may be directely expressed by
the participants themselves, or inferred from their ac-
14tions by the observers."
Applying Masotti and Bowen’s standard of ’ex­
pressed or inferred intent' to the riots, we find that
13Kerner Commission, Report on Disorders, pp. 130-
131.
14Masotti and Bowen, "Civil Violence," p. 13.
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the statements and actions of a sizeable segment of 
blacks sustain a view of riots as political phenomena. A 
Kerner Commission survey of blacks in 15 American cities 
found over half of those interviewed viewed the riots as 
predominantly protests (see Table 1). Around a fourth 
saw them as at least partly protest in nature. These re­
sults square with the findings of Tomlinson and Sears who 
interviewed both blacks arrested in the course of the 
Watts riot in Los Angeles and blacks who were not arrested 
but who resided in the riot area. (The Kerner Commission 
sample was not drawn from Los Angeles.) When asked to 
choose the term best characterizing the riot, 38 percent
of the curfew area residents chose "revolt,11 "revolution,"
15
or "insurrection," as did 45 percent of those arrested.
One might argue that people tend to read meaning into 
past actions that had little or no meaning at the time' 
they were performed. However, Tomlinson and Sears found 
that the respondents were able to single out specific 
problems they felt were behind the riots: 38 percent of
the curfew zone residents and 51 percent of those arrested 
cited particular grievances, including "discrimination
15Tomlinson and Sears, "Riot Ideology," p. 384.
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TABLE 1 
CHARACTER OF THE RIOTS
Responses
Blacks
Men Women
Mainly protest 56% 59%
Mainly looting 9 10
50/50 mixture 30 25
Don’t know 5 6
Total 100% 100%
Source: National Advisory Commission on Civil Dis­
orders (Kerner Commission), Supplemental 
Studies for the National Advisory Commission 
on Civil Disorders (New York: Frederick A. 
Praeger, Publishers, 1968), p. 4 7 ^
The 15 cities in the Kerner Commission survey 
were Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Cincinnati, Cleveland, 
Detroit, Gary, Milwaukee, Newark, New York (Brooklyn 
only), Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, San Francisco,
St. Louis, and Washington, D.C.
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and mistreatment by whites" (7 percent of curfew area 
residents, 4 percent of arrestees); "poverty, economic 
deprivation, inadequate services" (10 percent and 5 per­
cent) ; "police mistreatment" (21 percent and 42 percent); 
and "pent-up hostility, desire for revenge, fed up" (26 
percent and 34 percent).^  As Table 2 indicates, the 
Kerner Commission's 15-city survey revealed a similar 
propensity by blacks to focus on specific socio-economic 
grievances.
Masotti and Bowen point to the actions of the 
rioters as their basis for saying that the riots were po­
litical in character. The rioters, they note, were very 
selective in their choice of targets. White policemen 
were singled out for attack, and white-owned stores looted
and burned while the property of blacks often went un-
18touched. They cite no hard evidence to back up this 
statement, but it is consistent with what the Kerner Com­
mission found. While cautioning against oversimplified 
profiles of the "typical" riot, the commission neverthe­
less felt safe in drawing certain general conclusions
18Masotti and Bowen, "Civil Violence," p. 13.
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TABLE 2
GRIEVANCES BEHIND THE RIOTS
Grievances
Blacks
Men Women
Discrimination, un­
fair treatment 49%a 48%
Unemployment 23 22
Inferior jobs 13 10
Bad housing 23 20
Poor education 10 9
Poverty 10 8
Police brutality 10 4
Black power or 
other radicals 4 5
Looters and other 
undesireables 11 11
Communists 0 0
Total 1537. 127%
Percentages do not sum to 100 since some people 
mentioned more than one grievance.
Source: National Advisory Commission on Civil Dis­
orders (Kerner Commission), Supplemental 
Studies for the National Advisory Commission 
on Civil Disorders (New York: Frederick A.
Praeger, Publishers, 1968), p. 48.
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about the 1967 disturbances. One of them was that, "The
civil disorders of 1967 involved Negroes acting against
local symbols of white American society, authority and
19property in Negro neighborhoods . ." In support of
this conclusion the commission stated that,
White-owned businesses are widely believed to have 
been damaged much more frequently than those owned 
by Negroes. In at least nine of the cities studied, 
the damage seems to have been, at least in part, the 
result of deliberate attacks on white-owned busi­
nesses characterized in the Negro community as unfair
or disrespectful toward Negroes.^0
In answer, then, to the question posed at the out­
set, what appears to have happened in these years of tur­
moil was something more than a mindless campaign of wan­
ton destruction launched by a handful of social misfits.
If the riots did not add up to a full-scale revolution,
they did have a distinctly political character and shared 
with revolutions the objective of violently striking out 
at the civil order. They do, in short, qualify as a form 
of political violence. The next question is, what caused 
them?
19The Kerner Commission, Report of Disorders,
p. 6.
20Ibid., p. 116.
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The remainder of this chapter will center around 
the question of which of the three forms of relative dep­
rivation presented in Chapter I would have been most 
likely to have developed among blacks in the years prior 
to the riots. In the next section we will examine social 
and economic changes which would seem to have played a 
role in shaping the attitudes of blacks. Following this, 
a theory will be offered on how each of these changes in­
teracted to produce a sense of relative deprivation among 
blacks. Then we will examine a number of surveys on what 
blacks thought about several issues relating to their 
struggle for equality and to the riots. The goal there 
will not be to test the theory just formulated--that task 
is reserved for the statistical analysis in the final 
chapter, but to establish some initial plausibility for 
it, to see if it is worth testing. In the final part of
4
the chapter a number of propositions will be offered on 
the realtionship between relative deprivation and ghetto 
rioting, as well as on the relationships between the riots 
and other variables suggested by Gurr1s theory to be im­
portant in explaining political violence.
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The Gathering Storm
Obviously the ultimate answer to the question of 
what caused the riots is that black hostility was the pro­
duct of centuries of ill-treatment at the hands of whites. 
What I am looking for, however, are the developments that 
more immediately preceded the riots. Since blacks had 
suffered discrimination since the civil war but had never 
initiated violence on the scale of the riots in the 
1960's, one suspects that something must have changed in 
the decade or so before the riots. The task is to deter­
mine what that something was, and, for purposes of test­
ing Gurr1s theory, to do so in terms of a relative depri­
vation framework.
In the years prior to the riots three developments 
would seem to have been very important in determining the 
orientation of blacks toward white society. First, if 
blacks took themselves as their point of reference, rela­
tive to what they had experienced in the past things 
seemed to be getting better. While one would hesitate to 
paint a picture of dramatic improvement in every facet of 
black life, progress was being made in the two key areas 
of education and income. Sears and McConahay note that, 
"post-World War II increases in black educational attain­
ments are astounding. In 1940, black men aged 25-29
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averaged 6.5 years of education. By 1962, the average 
21
was 11.0.11 Table 3 charts a parallel growth in black 
income. These facts would indicate that the black rebel­
lion of the sixties was in some respects an affair of 
hope; that its roots are to be found in the heights of 
shattered dreams rather than the depths of despair.
However, while the above advances may have given 
blacks reason for optimism, a second, less favorable, 
trend paralleled it. If, on the one hand, the lot of 
blacks was improving relative to what it had been in the 
past, on the other hand, relative to whites things were 
getting worse. Based on compilations of data by the De­
partments of Labor and Commerce, the Kerner Commission 
noted, "Negro incomes still remain far below those of
whites. Negro median family income was only 5870 of white
22median income of 1966." Moreover,
Although it is growing, Negro family income is not 
keeping pace with white family income growth. In 
constant 1965 dollars, median nonwhite income in
21Sears and McConahay, The Politics of Violence,
p. 37.
22The Kerner Commission, Report on Disorders,
p. 251.
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TABLE 3
BLACK INCOME, 1947-1966
Group
Percentage of Black Families
1947 1960 1966
$7,000 and over 7% 17%a 28%a
$3,000 to $6,999 29 40 41
Under $3,000 65 44 32
Total 100% 101% 101%
SLAlthough no explanation is offered in the com­
mission report as to why the percentages do not sum to 
100, it is presumably due to the rounding off of decimal 
places.
Source: The National Advisory Commission on Civil
Disorders (Kerner Commission), Report of the 
National Advisory Commission on Civil Dis­
orders (New York: Bantam Books, Inc., 1968), 
p. 252.
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1947 was $2,174 lower than median white income. By 
1966, the gap had grown to $3 ,036. ^
This growing white-black gap was not manifest in 
education. Sears and McConahay observed that, "The ra­
cial differential has not been eliminated but it has been 
reduced. In 1940, whites had, on the average, 4.0 more
years of education than blacks; by 1962, the difference
24was only 1.5 years (12.5 versus 11.0)." However,
Davies, along with Sears and McConahay, learned that if 
one focuses on the differences in the capacities of blacks 
to translate education into income as compared to whites, 
here again we find blacks losing ground. Davies, after 
comparing the income of whites and blacks per year of ed­
ucation, concluded that,
(N)onwhites were closest to earning the same amount 
as the total population in 1952. They rose from 58 
percent in 1940 to 86 percent in 1952, but declined 
to a low of 747, in 1962. They did not return to their 
relative status of 1940, but they lost substantial 
ground compared with where they were in 1952.^
p. 37.
23Ibid.
24Sears and McConahay, The Politics of Violence,
25James C. Davies, "The J Curve of Rising Expecta­
tions and Declining Satisfactions as a Cause of Some Great 
Revolutions and a Contained Rebellion," in Violence in 
America, ed. by Hugh Davis Graham and Ted Robert Gurr (New 
York: The New American Library, 1969), pp. 701-702.
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Besides overall decline over timfe, Sears and McConahay
learned that blacks' ability to get a financial return on
their education diminished relative to whites as one went
up the education ladder:
In 1966, the white person with a grade school educa­
tion had a median income that was $1,099 above that 
of the black person with a comparable education. As 
education increased, the advantage of whites in­
creased, so that the difference between the races was 
$3,095 for people with a college degree.^6
Thus, blacks could not look to higher education as a means
of closing the gap with whites. If blacks measured their
progress in terms of position relative to whites, then,
there would seem to have been ample cause for despair.
The third development was the civil right move­
ment of the 1960’s. In some form or another, of course, 
agitation for black equality had been going on since the 
civil war. The most prominent institution of the pre-' 
1960’s campaign was the NAACP (National Association For 
The Advancement Of Colored People). The NAACP’s challenge 
to discrimination took place most notably in the courts, 
the crowning achievement of that approach coming in 1954 
with the Supreme Court’s landmark Brown v. Board of
2 6Sears and McConahay, The Politics of Violence,
p. 51.
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Education decision that outlawed segregation in southern 
public schools. As significant as this and other legal 
decisions were to be in their long-range effects, they 
were eclipsed by the far more visible and dramatic drives 
for equality that made up the social movement we have 
come to know as the civil rights movement. The latter 
was a nonviolent but physical assault on white institu­
tions that took the struggle for black dignity out of the 
hushed chambers of the nation’s courts and put it into 
the arena of America's streets. It began to rear its 
head in the boycotts of white businesses in Montgomery 
in 1955 and Tuskgegee in 1957, and gathered momentum in 
the late 1950's and early 1960's with student sit-ins and 
freedom rides. By the time President Kennedy fell to an 
assassin's bullet in 1963 a full-blown movement was under 
way, complete with national organizations such as CORE 
(Congress For Racial Equality ) , SNCC (Student Nonviolent 
Coordinating Committee), and the SCLC (Southern Christian 
Leadership Conference) to give it structure, and leaders 
such as Martin Luther King to give it inspiration. While 
these organizations and their leaders differed in many 
ways, their programs shared the common element of a 
demand--not a request, but a demand for equality with
with whites. And the demand was to be met not at some 
point in the distant future, but 'NOW!'
I would argue that the gains blacks made in the 
1950's, the growing gulf between them and whites, and the 
civil rights movement were the clouds of a gathering 
storm that first struck in midsummer of 1964 when riots 
convulsed the Harlem and Bedford Stuyvesant sections of 
New York City. What remains is to see just exactly how 
they joined together to produce that storm.
A Relative Deprivation Theory of 
Black Discontent
The growth of black incomes and education during 
the 1950's had two effects. First, it was obviously sat­
isfying in itself. Second, since there was still much 
room for improvement, it generated expectations of still 
further progress. If matters had continued on this track, 
contentment, not violence, would have been the eventual 
outcome. The expectations spawned by recent gains would 
be met by new improvements as levels of black income and 
education kept on rising. This would have been the case,' 
that is, if blacks had continued to use themselves as 
their point of reference. I would suggest that they did
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not, however, and this is where the civil rights move­
ment comes in.
The civil rights movement, aided and abetted by 
the federal government during the Kennedy and Johnson ad­
ministrations, effected a redefinition of the standards 
by which blacks measured progress in their daily lives.
It changed the standard from improvement relative to the 
black past to equality relative to the white present. 
Whites became the point of reference. Once this took 
place the mood of blacks changed from hopeful optimism to 
bitter frustration and resentment as blacks took stock of 
the growing gap between them and whites. The America 
blacks saw, the white America, was marked not only by the 
absence of widespread poverty, but by conspicuous con­
sumption. It had become, according to John Kenneth 
Galbraith, the "affluent society"; a nation so rich that 
the "conventional wisdom” of getting more wealth had to
be abandoned for a new philosophy on what to do with the
27
considerable wealth it already had.
Much of the frustration and violence might have 
been avoided if the message of equality had spread
27 .John Kenneth Galbraith, The Affluent Society
(New York: Mentor Books, 1958), pp. 13-17ff.
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slowly; or if escape from the ghetto had come quickly. 
However, on both scores time was on the side of turmoil. 
The tactics of the civil rights movement all but ruled 
out a gradual black awakening. Sit-ins and mass marches 
invite dramatic and immediate confrontation, not quiet, 
drawn-out accommodation. And the lack of skills among 
blacks placed an upper limit on how fast they could rise 
in technocratic America--to say nothing of the problem of 
white racism that defied swift resolution.
The above developments are graphically represented 
in Figure 8. The model depicted in Figure 8 is a modified 
version of Gurr's progressive deprivation model. It 
shares with Gurr's original model the elements of rising 
value expectations and value capabilities. The two dif­
fer in that in the Gurr model the sharp descrepancy be­
tween expectations and capabilities stems from a decline 
in capabilities. In the modified model presented below, 
it came about through a change in the nature of those ex­
pectations as blacks suddenly took whites as their point 
of reference. Given the superior status enjoyed by whites 
this meant a sharp rise in expectations which, in turn, 
produced a large discrepancy between black value expec­
tations and capabilities. Expectations of progress in
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the 1950’s were thus frustrated not by a reversal of that 
progress but by a change in the standards against which 
it was measured.
It should be noted that no attempt ha,s been made 
to single out a particular event or set of events as 
triggering feelings of frustration and anger among blacks. 
This is in contrast to Davies who argues that such feel­
ings could be traced to attacks on civil rights demonstra­
tors in the South in 1963. According to Davies,
This increase in violence, commencing so to speak 
with the firehoses and police dogs in May 1963 in 
Birmingham, affronted not only the physical safety 
of the demonstrators . . . This increase in violence
also affronted the dignity of black people as human 
beings. Black people sensed that their various and 
continuously rising expectations, now confronted with 
violence, were to rise no more.2**
Davies may be right, and, beside attacks on demonstrators, 
one could also point to the death of President Kennedy in 
November of 1963 as another event that blacks viewed as a 
setback. Certainly Kennedy's dramatic nationwide televi­
sion address in which he characterized civil rights as a 
moral concern for all Americans, marked him as a champion 
of the black cause. However, focusing on specific events
2 8Davies, "The J Curve of Rising Expectations,"
p. 701.
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which may or may not have been decisive in some sense, is 
risky; the risk being one of attributing to narrow events 
outcomes produced by broad social processes for which 
events were merely the catalysts. To avoid this problem 
the argument has been limited to saying that three de­
velopments- -rising black living standards and expectations 
in the 1950's, the increasingly large gap between blacks 
and whites, and rapid assimilation of the ethic of 
equality--interacted in such"a way as to produce a sudden 
awareness of their inferior position relative to whites-- 
i.e., a sense of relative deprivation. It is this sense 
of relative deprivation that is being identified as the 
motive for the riots, leaving to speculation the exact 
role played by individual events.
It follows that if no particular event is being 
singled out, the exact time cannot be fixed as to when 
the perception of a gap between blacks and whites crys­
tallized. It has been set at 1963 because the civil 
rights movement was getting into full swing in that year, 
culminating with the March on Washington in August, but 
that is just a rough guess. It could have been earlier, 
it could have been a little later.
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Supporting Evidence
The above theory on black discontent is just 
that--a theory. It is built around extrapolations from 
aggregate data on black incomes and education to conclu­
sions on the states of mind of blacks at points prior to 
the riots. In general terms this is similar to what Gurr 
did in his 114 nation study discussed earlier. Given the 
considerable difficulty of interviewing, recourse to in­
ference from aggregate data is quite understandable, es­
pecially in the case of a study such as Gurr's where in­
terviewing means expensive cross-national interviewing.
In the present study the same problem exists. Because of 
the considerable time, effort, and expense involved no at­
tempt has been made to test Gurr's theory by means of 
opinion surveys. Instead, a theory on black discontent 
has been proposed that will be tested by statistical anal­
ysis of aggregate data. However, because a single coun­
try has been selected as the setting for the research-- 
and a wealthy, industrial country at that--the problem is 
not quite as severe. In connection with the ghetto riots 
as well as the civil rights problem in general, a number 
of polls were taken in the United States to tap the sen-
r
timent of blacks on matters germane to the theory. They
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consist of two nationwide polls done by Louis Harris and 
Associates in 1963 and 1966, and several smaller polls 
conducted by the Kerner Commission in cities hard-hit by 
the riots. Not all the assumptions made in the theory 
are covered by these polls. Naturally, they provide no 
information on the assumption that blacks in the 1950’s 
measured progress against their past life styles. Nor is 
the implied phenomenon of a transition from one standard 
to another in the 1960's tapped by the polls. And the 
assumptions that are covered, namely, that blacks by 1963 
were thinking in terms of equality with whites and that 
they were not satisfied with the pace of progress toward 
this goal, are not supported directly with questions 
framed in terms identical to them. The polls do, however, 
provide evidence that can be argued to be consistent with 
these assumptions.
While no questions were asked on the specific 
question of whether blacks wanted equality with whites, 
it is fairly clear from the Harris survey in 1963 that 
they did not want separatism. Despite the attention in 
the media gained by the Black Muslims, their message of 
separation between the races apparently fell on deaf ears 
for a large number of blacks. Only 6 percent of those
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polled said they approved of the Black Muslims, 53 per­
cent said they disapproved, and the remaining 41 percent
29
were "not sure." On questions relating to the mixing
of whites and blacks under various circumstances, the
Harris poll revealed a striking endorsement by blacks of
integration over separatism. Seventy-six percent of those
polled said they preferred working in a mixed group of
whites and blacks versus 11 percent who favored working
30mostly with blacks. A similar picture emerges in hous­
ing. Only 20 percent of the respondents favored living
in all-black neighborhoods, with 64 percent preferring to
31
have both whites and blacks as neighbors. When asked, 
"would you like to see all Negro children in your family 
go to school with white children or not," 70 percent said 
they would.^
29William Brink and Louis Harris, Black and White 
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1967), p. 262. The results 
of both the 1963 and 1966 polls are reported in Black and 
White.
30Ibid., p. 232.
31Ibid.
32Ibid., p. 234.
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If one can make the assumption that a desire to 
work, live and have one's children attend school with 
whites implies a desire to be equal to whites, then these 
results add up to a very strong endorsement of the goal 
of equality as of 1963.
To the extent that we can assume blacks equated 
advancement of negro rights with progress toward equal­
ity, then the same Harris survey demonstrated that a 
sizeable segment of blacks, if not an overwhelming major- 
ith, were impatient with the pace of progress toward 
equality. Fifty-one percent said they thought the cause 
of Negro rights was moving "to slow"; for 31 percent it
33was "about right," and 3 percent said it was "too fast."
Attitudes on equality have been singled out, of 
course, because failure to achieve equality is held to 
have been a major factor in causing the riots. If this 
is the case, it would follow that those who took part in 
the riots would be more sensitive to the civil rights 
movement and discrimination than those who did not. Sur­
veys made by the Kerner Commission bear this out. Table 
4 presents the results of a survey done in Newark
33Ibid., p. 258.
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TABLE 4 
BLACK RIGHTS DISCUSSION
Frequency Rioters (106) Nonrioters (126)
Nearly everyday 53. 8% 34. 97o
Once a week 12.3 7.9
From time to time 31.1 52.4
Never 0.0 0.0
Don't know 2.8 4.8 p < .025
Total 1007c 1007c
Source: National Advisory Commission on Civil Dis­
orders (Kerner Commission), Report of the 
National Advisory Commission on Civil Dis­
orders (New York: Bantam Books, Inc., 1968), 
p. 178.
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comparing rioters and nonrioters on how often they dis­
cussed negro rights.
A second survey compared rioters and nonrioters 
on what they thought were the main obstacles to employ­
ment. As Table 5 indicates, rioters showed a greater 
willingness to perceive discrimination as an obstacle to 
employment than those who did not participate in the 
Newark riot.
Obviously these polls fall short of being a good 
test -of the theory of black discontent. Their results 
have been reported only to show that at least some of the 
assumptions made on how blacks saw their lot in the 1960's 
are not pure speculation. The hope is to add some plau­
sibility to the theory by reducing--but certainly not 
eliminating--reliance on sheer inference for state of 
mind phenomena. We can say that what hard evidence exists 
on the states of mind of blacks is at least consistent 
with what has been proposed in the theory.
Testable Implications
Of the two factors cited as responsible for black 
discontent, only two--expectations spawned by gains in 
the 1950's and inequality with whites in the 1960's--will 
be incorporated into a definition of relative deprivation.
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TABLE 5
PERCEIVED OBSTACLES TO EMPLOYMENT
Rioters (71) Nonrioters (88)
Lack of Training 18.3% 41.2%
Lack of Experience 12.7 8.8
Discrimination 69.0 50.0 p < .025
Total 100% 100%
Source: National Advisory Commission on Civil Dis­
orders (Kerner Commission), Report of the 
National Advisory Commission on Civil Dis­
orders (New York: Bantam Books, Inc. , 1968) , 
p. 175.
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The third, the impact of the civil rights movement, has 
been omitted for want of suitable aggregate measures.
One that initially suggested itself, frequency of civil 
rights activity in a city, was dismissed because gather­
ing data on it would have entailed a search of local news­
papers for cities all across the country. Only a few 
such newspapers are on the subscription lists of academic 
libraries.
Focusing on the other two factors, then, relative 
deprivation is defined as a combination of growth-induced 
expectations and inequality with whites. (For brevity, 
the latter factor will be referred to as "discrimina- 
tion.1') Relative deprivation is expected to be greatest 
in cities in which the black population experienced the 
highest level of growth-induced expectations in the 
1950's, on the one hand, but, on the other hand, suffered 
the greatest amount of discrimination in the 1960's. The 
following proposition is offered on the relationship be­
tween relative deprivation and the riots:
*
Proposition 1: There is a positive, linear relationship
between relative deprivation and the magnitude of ghetto
riots.
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Mediating Variables 
As pointed out earlier in the discussion of Gurr's 
model, violence is not a foregone conclusion in each and 
every case in which social discontent exists. The ef­
fect of other conditions must be taken into account in 
assessing a person's willingness to resort to violence 
as a means of redressing grievances. ‘Some of these con­
ditions may have the effect of soothing anger by bringing 
about a solution to underlying problems. Some, on the 
other hand, are additional sources of irritation which-- 
though of minor significance under most circumstances-- 
take on great importance in conjunction with pre-existing 
feelings of hostility. Others will have the effect of 
inhibiting the violent expression of discontent while 
leaving root causes of these feelings untouched. Finally, 
some combine to create a social environment that promotes 
or lends support to the use of violence. In this section 
of the study the task is to identify a few of those medi­
ating variables that appear to have had a significant im­
pact on blacks in making their decision to riot. Three 
broad types of mediating conditions will be considered: 
social control variables, social facilitation variables, 
and government capabilities.
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Social Control
Social control refers to the overall process 
whereby a society seeks to limit undesireable behavior. 
Governments adopt a variety of measures to control such 
behavior, including coercive force.
Recalling the discussion in chapter two, research 
on political violence and coercive force used to control 
such violence has shown the relationship between them to 
be curvilinear: Low to moderate levels of force serve
only to frustrate and anger people further and spur them 
on to even greater violence, whereas, with large amounts 
of force, fear begins to override anger to effect a re­
duction of violence.^
The chief instrument of coercive control involved 
in the ghetto turmoil is the police, and in this study an 
attempt will be made to discover the relationship between 
the size of city police departments and the magnitude of 
the riots. The following proposition is offered to de­
scribe their relationship.
34
See p. 33 of this study.
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Proposition 2: There is a positive, linear relationship
between the size of city police departments and the mag-
tude of ghetto riots.
The assumed causal process involved in this rela­
tionship is that as the size of the police department in­
creases, the likelihood of hostile encounters between the 
police and ghetto residents increases. The encounters 
may not be particularly violent or involve a large number 
of persons. However, they tend to generate feelings of 
hostility and frustration and further anger persons al­
ready discontented over their social conditions. Arrests 
or reprimands for vagrancy, disturbing the peace, or drunk 
driving are three examples of this type of incident. It 
is not thought that police departments were of sufficient 
size to deter rioters. Hence, a curvilinear pattern has 
not been proposed.
A number of studies on black grievances support 
this view of the police as a tension-generating agent. 
Sears and McConahay found that 42 percent of the black
arrestees in Los Angeles cited police mistreatment as one
35
of the causes of the Watts riot. A nationwide Gallup 
35
Sears and McConahay, The Politics of Violence,
p. 167.
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poll in 1965 revealed that 35 percent of black males
believed there was police brutality in their areas versus
367 percent of white males who had the same opinion. In
1964 the New York Times conducted a survey in Harlem which
showed that 43 percent of those interviewed thought there
37was police brutality. The Kerner Commission found that 
this charge lacked a factual basis. It stated in its re­
port that, "when police-citizen contacts are systematic­
ally observed, the vast majority are handled without an­
tagonism or incident." Its examination of 5,039 police-
citizen contacts turned up only 20--or three-tenths of 1
3 8percent--cases of excessive force by the police. Nev­
ertheless, the commission noted, certain police practices 
understandably generated a large number of irritating in­
cidents to be later lumped by blacks under the broad pan­
oply of "brutality."
These practices, sometimes known as "aggressive pre­
ventive patrol," take a number of forms, but invari­
ably they involve a large number of police-citizen 
contacts initiated by police rather than in response
36Cited in The Kerner Commission, Report on Pis
orders, p. 302.
37Ibid. 
38Ibid.
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to a call for help or service. One such practice 
utilizes a roving task force which moves into high- 
crime districts without prior notice, and conducts 
intensive, often indiscriminate, street stops and 
searches. A number of persons who might legitimately 
be described as suspicious are stopped. But so also 
are persons whom the beat patrolman would know are 
respected members of the c o m m u n i t y . ^ 9
Facilitation
According to Gurr, the factors that faciliate po­
litical violence consist of "past strife," and "social 
and structural facilitation," the latter referring to 
dissident organizations like the communist party (social 
facilitation) and physical aspects of a society, such as 
poorly developed transportation networks and rugged moun­
tainous regions, that provide rebels with secure bases 
(structural facilitation).^
A direct application of Gurr's scheme to ghetto 
riots is ruled out for three reasons. First neither the 
organizational nor the physical-environmental components 
of 'social and structural facilitation' are relevant to 
the riots. There is no indication whatsoever in any
~^Ibid. , p. 304.
40Ted Robert Gurr, "A Causal Model of Civil 
Strife: A Comparative Analysis Using New Indices," Amer­
ican Political Science Review, LXII (December 1968),
p. 1106.
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studies on the riots of their having been planned, 
executed, or materially supported by organized parties, 
groups, cliques, factions, cabals, etc. The Kerner Com­
mission's conclusion on the riots of 1967 is typical:
On the basis of all the information collected the 
Commission concludes that the urban disorders of the 
summer of 1967 were not caused by, nor were they the 
consequence of, any organized plan or "conspiracy." 
Specifically, the Commission has found no evidence 
that all or any of the disorders or the incidents 
that led to them were planned or directed by any 
organization or group, international, national or 
local.^
Furthermore, all the ghettos would rank about the 
same on a scale of physical remoteness. Located in the 
heart of the city, all were highly accessible to the po­
lice. Second, Gurr’s taxonomy of facilitating conditions 
is cumbersome. He makes an awkward distinction between 
past strife and social and structural facilitation. Past 
strife is proposed as bearing on political violence by 
way of fostering "beliefs justifying violent responses to 
deprivation."^ Beliefs justifying violence are a social 
phenomenon and should be classified as such. Third, while
41The Kerner Commission, Report on Disorders,
p. 202.
42
Gurr, "A Causal Model," p. 1106.
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the variable of past strife is relevant to the riots as 
well as to political violence in general, the reason Gurr 
gives for why it i^ relevant-- spawning a set of violence- 
justifying beliefs--is vague. By ’justifying beliefs’, 
does Gurr mean something on the order of an elaborate 
ideology such as Marxism? Gurr seems to suggest he does 
not. He says that these beliefs are an outgrowth of an 
"interaction process," indicating an informal, ad hoc line 
of development with a loosely organized, uncodified, and, 
perhaps, only tacitly expressed set of assumptions on vi­
olence as its end product. However, the matter is ulti­
mately unclear.
In this study, past strife in the form of previous 
riots is proposed as a social factor, which facilitated 
subsequent riots in two ways. First, previous riots weak­
ened normative constraints against violence. Violence in 
any society is a serious matter and very strong norms ex­
ist against its use. The power of these norms to restrain 
behavior can be weakened in one of two ways. First, the 
norms can be weakened if they are challenged in principle 
as being wrong. In the case of prohibitions against vio­
lence this is not likely to happen. Most people will 
agree that, in principle, violence is to be condemned.
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A survey on the attitudes of American men toward violence
disclosed that 97 percent of the respondents disapproved
43
of violence in principle. The restraining power of so­
cial norms can be weakened in a second way: by the mere
fact that they are violated. Matters may never develop 
to the point where norms are challenged in the abstract, 
but, because a number of persons have transgressed against 
them, it becomes much easier for others to conceive of 
doing so themselves. This is precisely the effect that I 
believe previous riots to have had. Nothing on the order 
of a competing set of beliefs justifying violence arose 
to displace old norms against it; rather, the grip of 
those norms was weakened by the deeds of others. The 
mere fact that some had rioted before loosened normative 
constraints for others later.
Second, apart from moral considerations, previous 
riots facilitated later riots because riots were seen by 
blacks as effective instruments for desired change. They 
eased the way for later riots by leading people to reason, 
'right or wrong, rioting works.' A fair amount of survey
43Monica D. Blumenthal, et al., Justifying Vio­
lence: Attitudes of American Men (New York: Harper 6c Row,
Publishers, 1971), p. 23.
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data supports this assertion. These surveys show that 
the conviction that rioting helped the cause of blacks 
existed among a substantial segment of the black communi­
ty. In Sears and McConahay's study of the Watts riot, re­
spondents were aksed, "Do you think it [the Watts riot] 
helped or hurt the Negro cause?" As Table 6 shows, even 
among those not clearly marked off as rioters and whose 
answers, therefore, could not be dismissed as rationaliza­
tions of past behavior, over a third felt the riots had 
helped. Also the replies of whites and Mexican-Americans 
demonstrate that black sentiment was not merely part of 
some self-evident platitude shared by the whole community. 
But for the inclusion of these two comparison groups, one 
might be tempted to make this agrument since the Sears 
and McConahay surveys were made after passage of the 1964 
Civil Right Act.
Benjamin Singer's research in Detroit revealed 
that while in 1964 only 2 percent of blacks felt the riots
had been beneficial, by 1969 40 percent were willing to
44express this view. Finally, a study done for the Kerner 
44Benjamin D. Singer, "Mass Media and Communica­
tion Processes as Factors in the Detroit Riot of 1967," 
in Black Revolt, p. 357.
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TABLE 6 
EFFECTIVENESS OF WATTS RIOT
Responses
Black
Curfew
Zone
Black
Arrestees
Whites Mexican
Americans
Helped 38%* 54% 19% 21%
No difference, 
don11 know 30 33 5 2
Hurt 24 . 9 75 75
No answer, 
other 8 4 1 2
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
Source: David 0. Sears and John B. McConahay, The
Politics of Violence: The New Urban Blacks
and the Watts Riot (Boston: The Houghton 
Mifflin Company, 1973), p. 161.^
The Sears and McConahay surveys were done in 
1965 and 1966.
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Commission report disclosed that over a third of the
respondents in the black sample, drawn from 15 American
46cities, felt the riots had done some good. A follow-up 
survey asking the same respondents why they thought the 
riots had helped, revealed 1 tangible gains' to be the 
most frequently cited reason (see Table 7).
The following proposition is offered on the rela­
tionship between previous and later riots:
Proposition 3: There is a positive, linear relationship
between the magnitude of previous riots and the magnitude 
of later riots.
Governmental Capacity
Early in the chapter it was pointed out that 
blacks were able to cite specific greivances including 
general discrimination and socio-economic problems as 
causes for the rioting (see pp. 58-60). If this is the 
case, it would follow that differences in the capacity of 
city governments to deal with these grievances would have 
a bearing on the amount of racial trouble the city
46National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders 
Kerner Commission), Supplemental Studies for the National 
Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (New York: 
Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1968), p. 49.
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TABLE 7
WHY THE RIOTS HELPED
Reasons
Blacks
Men Women
Tangible gains (e.g., 
more jobs) 19%a 20%
Whites understand 
Black problems better 14 10
Show of Negro power 9 5
SL
For brevity I have extracted only a part of a 
larger table given in the study. The percentages do not 
sum to 100 because they represent only a portion of the 
total sample covered in the original table.
Source: National Advisory Commission on Civil Dis­
orders (Kerner Commission), Supplemental 
Studies for the National Advisory Commission 
on Civil Disorders (New York: Frederick A. 
Praeger, Publishers, 1968), p. 49.
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experiences. Tangible evidence for this inference is 
provided by a Kerner Commission survey, in which blacks 
were asked if there was anything their city government 
could do to avoid a conflagration such as the one that 
had racked Detroit. As Table 8 indicates, the overwhelm­
ing majority (8270 for men, 74% for women) felt something 
could be done to stave off a Detroit-like disturbance.
Only a very small minority felt nothing would help. Pro­
position 4 states the hypothesized relationship between 
government capacity and rioting.
Proposition 4: There is a negative, linear relationship
between governmental capacity and the magnitude of riots.
The variable of 'governmental capacity1 is based 
on Gurr's variable of "institutionalization"--but only 
loosely. Gurr's explanation of how institutionalization 
relates to political violence is confusing. Institution­
alization supposedly reduces violence, but just what is 
involved in achieving .this effect is unclear. In present­
ing the concept Gurr explains institutionalization in­
volves societal structures which act to reduce violence 
by (a) providing nonviolent outlets for pent-up hostili­
ties, and (b) by providing alternative ways by which 
those things of which people are deprived can be obtained.
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TABLE 8
CITY GOVERNMENT ACTION
First Responses
Blacks
Men Women
Better employment 26% 24%
End discrimination 14 15
Better housing 8 8
Other social and economic 
improvements 7 5
Better police treatment • 6 1
Improve communications 
between blacks and whites; 
show blacks whites care 12 13
More black control of 
institutions 0 0
More police control 9 8
Can't do anything, have 
tried everything 3 5
Don't know 15 21
Total 100% 100%
Source: National Advisory Commission on Civil Dis­
orders (Kerner Commission), Supplemental 
Studies for the National Advisory Commission 
on Civil Disorders (New York: Frederick A. 
Praeger, Publishers, 1968), p. 48.
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The societal structures ostensibly performing both func­
tions are, or appear to be, nongovernmental associations 
such as political parties and labor unions. In laying 
out the concept Gurr makes no mention of what is normally 
regarded as the government--!.e ., some form of executive, 
be it a monarch, a president, a dictator, or whatever; 
or, a legislative body such as a parliament; or, perhaps, 
some type of bureaucracy. The confusion comes about when 
Gurr proceeds from defining institutionalization to pre­
senting his operational measures of it. In addition to 
two expected indices of union membership and political 
party stability, he presents one on the government: "cen­
tral government budget expenditures as a percentage of
47Gross Domestic Product." Inclusion of this index on 
the government appears to mean institutionalization in­
volves an additional, distinctly different type of social 
structure from the two nongovermental ones Gurr first 
mentioned, and, with that new societal structure, an ad­
ditional conflict-reducing function, of directly relieving 
discontent through expenditure of government funds. While 
Gurr’s designation of the government and its services as
^Gurr, "A Causal Model," p. 1*113.
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part of institutionalization may be perfectly valid, the 
haphazard way in which this is done leaves one wondering 
about just what the concept means in Gurr's mind.
In light of this confusion, no attempt has been 
made to apply Gurr's conceptually vague notion of insti­
tutionalization to blacks. Instead I have borrowed from 
it by taking one of its suggested dimensions: the capa­
city of the government to take action toward relieving 
discontent. Governmental capacity was selected because 
it can be easily operationalized in terms of expenditures, 
and because it rests on the straightforward thesis that 
discontent can be neutralized by dealing with its causes-- 
and expending money is an effective means of dealing with 
these causes.
Labor union activity was not selected because it 
is questionable whether blacks in the United States re­
gard unions as effective groups for dealing with their 
problems. A nationwide Harris poll in 1963 found that 
only 38 percent of blacks were willing to rate unions as 
"more helpful" in advancing the cause of blacks, with 25 
percent feeling they were "more harmful," and 37 percent 
saying they were "not sure." When the Harris sample was 
subdivided according to income, a full 50 percent of the
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low income groups said they were more harmful, with 19
percent not being sure and only 31 percent willing to re-
48gard them as more helpful. Presumably this ambivalence, 
if not hostility, stems from charges that many unions, 
particularly in the skilled trades, discriminate against 
blacks. I will not go into whether this is the real rea­
son or whether these charges are well-founded, because 
these questions are not relevant for my purposes. What 
is relevant is that a majority of .blacks did not view 
unions as effective instruments for improving their so­
cial conditions. This precludes regarding unions as con­
flict-reducing agents.
As for the other facet of institutionalization, 
political parties, a search of a number of sources, in­
cluding census data, failed to turn up any reliable ag­
gregate measure that would allow me to relate political 
parties to the rioting. Affiliation to American parties 
is most systematically measured in registration and vot­
ing totals. Neither of these was reported on a city-by- 
city basis for blacks.
^Brink and Harris, ‘Black and White, p. 234.
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Legitimacy
The variable of legitimacy, included in Gurr's 
model, was not included in the present study for want of 
an aggregate measure of it. One plausible one that came 
to mind, voting turn out for blacks, could not be used 
for the reason just cited above.
Summary
In this chapter a model has been developed to ac­
count for why blacks in the United States rioted. A var­
iant of Gurr's 'progressive deprivation' syndrome was se­
lected as the best characterization for how initial dis­
content developed. The heart of ,the modified progressive 
deprivation model presented is the proposition that a re­
definition of standards brought on by the civil rights 
movement was responsible for initial discontent. Several 
factors thought to have interacted with that discontent, 
either by way of translating it into violence or by re­
ducing it, were then introduced. What remains is to op­
erationalize the model by defining suitable aggregate 
measures of its components, and then to test it.
CHAPTER III
MEASUREMENT AND TESTING
In the previous chapter four separate relation­
ships have been proposed between the magnitude of the 
ghetto riots, the dependent variable, and the independent 
variables of relative deprivation, police department size, 
the magnitude of previous riots, and governmental capa­
city. In the cases of relative deprivation, police de­
partment size, and previous riots the relationships are 
asserted to be positive, meaning the greater the level of 
each one of these variables, the greater the magnitude of 
the riots. In the case of governmental capacity the re­
lationship between it and the mangitude of the riots is 
posited as negative, with increases in governmental ca­
pacity associated with decreases in the magnitude of the 
riots.
In this chapter, each of the above propositions 
will be tested. This will entail developing numerical 
indices for each of the variables, and then incorporating 
these indices into a single regression model.
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Units of Analysis
The choice of units of analysis was dictated by 
the availability of Census Bureau data. Measurement of 
one of the independent variables, relative deprivation, 
entailed comparisons between the socio-economic attain­
ments of blacks in 1950 and those in 1960. One of two 
possible indices of such attainments, education, was not 
available in the 1950 census reports except for cities in 
the South. The other, median income, was reported, but 
only for cities with populations of 100,000 or more in 
1950. To make the necessary comparisons between 1950 and 
1960, these cities had to become the units of analysis.
There were 169 such cities. However, a lack of 
data for certain variables for a number of them made it 
necessary to run the final regression analysis with a re­
duced sample of 70 cities.'*'
Measures: Riot Magnitude
The dependent variable riot magnitude was measured 
in terms of casualties resulting from the riot.
^"United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of 
the Census, United States Census of Population: 1950, Vol. 
II, Characteristics of the Population, parts 3-42; United 
States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Uni­
ted States Census of Population: 1960, Vol. II, Character­
istics of the Population, parts 3-44, Tables 77 and 78.
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Information was obtained on the total number of persons 
killed, wounded, or injured in the riots that took place 
between 1964 and 1968. For each riot these three figures 
were summed to form the composite index riot magnitude. 
The figures on the number of persons killed were modified 
by multiplying them by 1.5 since it was felt that the raw 
number of killed, always small relative to injured and 
wounded figures, did not adequately reflect the serious­
ness of a riot in which persons lost their lives. Data 
on riot casualties were obtained from the New York Times 
using its index, Facts of File, and the Senate Subcommit­
tee on Investigations report, Riots: Civil and Criminal
Disorders.^
Measures: Independent Variables
Relative Deprivation
As posited earlier, relative deprivation for 
blacks in the years prior to the riots involved an inter­
action between three factors, two of which have been in­
dexed in this study: presumed growth of black
2
U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Government 
Operations, Riots: Civil and Criminal Disorders, Hear­
ings , before a Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations 
of the Committee on Investigations, Senate, 90th Cong., 
1st sess., November 1, 2, 3, and 6, 1967. Part 1. (Wash­
ington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1967).
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expectations stemming from a rise in living standards 
during the 1950’s, and the gap between whites and blacks 
in the 1960’s. Growth in living standards in the 1950's 
involved gains in income and education, and ideally both 
would be incorporated into an index of rising expecta­
tions. However, as mentioned above, to measure this rise 
in expectations requires figures for both 1950 and 1960, 
and only data on median income were available. Conse­
quently, growth in black expectations was indexed by 
growth in median income. The size of this growth was 
computed by subtracting the 1950 Census Bureau median in­
come figures from those of 1960. The difference between 
the 1950 and 1960 figures was then divided by the 1950 
figure to get a percentage increase in median income 
score. This percentage is regarded as an index of black 
expectations. Since the Kerner Commission surveys re­
vealed that the overwhelming majority of the rioters were 
male (typically over 90 percent) the data on median in­
come were gathered for black males only.
The second measureable element of relative depri­
vation is the white-black gap, which will here be termed 
’’discrimination." For each city discrimination was mea­
sured by subtracting black male median income for 1960
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from 'total male median income for 1960. Ideally figures 
from white males only would be used in computing the dis­
crimination score. However, the Census Bureau did not 
provide such.
To capture the essence of relative deprivation as 
stemming from an interaction between expectations and dis­
crimination, with both factors being necessary for rela­
tive deprivation, the final relative deprivation index 
was computed by multiplying the expectations score by the 
discrimination score.
Coercive Force
The social control variable of coercive force was 
measured in terms of the size of the city police depart­
ment. Information on police department size was obtained
from the Uniform Crime Reports for the United States for 
3
1967, compiled by the Department of Justice, and from
4
The Municipal Yearbook 1970.
3
U.S. Department of Justice, Uniform Crime Reports 
for the United States 1967 (Washington D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1967), pp. 74-75.
4
The International City Management Association,
The Municipal Yearbook 1970 (Washington, D.C.: City Man­
agement Association, 1970), pp. 450-469.
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Facilitation
A prior riots index was constructed by summing 
the riot magnitude scores of each city for the years from 
1964 to 1967. To test Proposition 3, which held that pre­
vious riots paved the way for later ones, prior riots was 
added to the other independent variables in a special 
equation in which the dependent variables was the magni­
tude of the 1968 riots.
Governmental Capacity
To test the fourth proposition which predicts a 
negative relationship between governmental capacity and 
the magnitude of the riots, two separate variables were 
created to represent governmental capacity. The first 
was welfare expenditures by the city government in 1960; 
the second, total government expenditures by the city in 
1960 for services other than welfare. For both variables 
the hypothesized relationship between them and riot mag- 
nitude is negative and linear. Data for welfare and to- 
al government expenditures were obtained from the City 
and County Data Book for 1962.
5
United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of 
the Census, City and County Data Book 1962 (Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1963), Tables 451 6c 452.
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The choice of welfare expenditures to index 
governmental capacity seemed obvious. Such expenditures 
seemed a straightforward application of the principle be­
hind governmental capacity: channeling government re­
sources directly to deprived individuals. In light of 
the well-known poverty of blacks, it seemed a safe assump­
tion that a substantial segment of such deprived indivi­
duals would be black, although the City and County Data 
Book--the most systematic compilation of welfare figures 
that could be found--did not provide information of what 
proportion of a city's welfare expenditures went to 
blacks.
Total government expenditures represents money 
spent on public transportation, sanitation, parks, and 
hospitals. The choice of it as an index of governmental 
capacity did not seem as obvious since the services in­
volved are not expressly intended to assist the poor. 
However, since the poor are disproportionatly dependent 
on services such as public transportation to help them in 
getting jobs, or public hospitals because they cannot af­
ford expensive private ones, it was felt that including 
expenditures on these nonwelfare types of services was
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necessary to get a complete picture of a city's effort to 
deal with the grievances of deprived persons.
Control Variables
A control variable, black population in 1960, was 
added to the other independent variables. This is to 
separate out trivial relationships between the dependent 
variable and the independent variables of police depart­
ment size, welfare, and total government expenditures.
Riot magnitude will naturally correlate with the size of 
the black population alone. The more blacks in a city, 
the bigger the riot. And, the size of each of the three 
independent variables just mentioned will also correlate 
with black population, since each will be greater for 
larger cities and the larger the city, typically, the 
larger the black population. If black population were 
not inserted as a control, we would observe strong but 
trivial relationships between riot magnitude and the three 
independent variables due to the number of blacks in the 
city.
The Regression Models
A regression model is a statistical equation spe­
cifying a positive or negative linear relationship between
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a dependent variable, set on the left-hand side of the 
equation, and one or more independent variables, set on 
the right-hand side. A regression coefficient is computed 
for each independent variable. The regression coefficient 
indicates the direction of the linear relationship between 
its associated independent variable and the dependent var­
iable when all other independent variables in the equation 
have been held constant. ’Holding constant' is a statis­
tical procedure for separating out the effects of a given 
independent variable on the dependent variable from the 
effects of other independent variables on the same depen­
dent variable. Because the procedure is incorporated 
into the computation of the regression coefficient, the 
regression coefficient, if statistically significant, 
tells us that a relationship which cannot be accounted 
for in terms of the other independent variables exists 
between its respective independent variable and the de­
pendent variable; conversely, if such a relationship does 
exist, the regression coefficient will not be statisti­
cally significant.
In this study each of the four propositions pre­
sented above holds that a statistically significant rela­
tionship of a specified nature, either positive or
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negative, will exist between a certain independent var­
iable and riot magnitude after the other independent var­
iables have been held constant. So, for example, propo­
sition 1 posits that a relationship exists between rela­
tive deprivation and riot magnitude after police depart­
ment size, prior riots, total government expenditures, 
and welfare expenditures have been held constant; propo­
sition 2 asserts that a relationship exists between po­
lice department size and riot magnitude after relative 
deprivation, prior riots, and so forth, have been held 
constant. Regression analysis is the appropriate statis­
tical procedure for testing propositions of this sort. 
Accordingly, each of the above indices will be incorpo­
rated into a regression model, with the regression coef­
ficient being used to test the proposition relating each
*
of the indices for the independent variables to riot 
magnitude.
Restating each proposition in the language of the 
regression model, proposition 1 predicts that the regres­
sion coefficient for relative deprivation will be signif­
icant and positive; proposition 2 asserts that the coef­
ficient for police department size will be significant 
and positive; proposition 3 predicts the coefficient for
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prior riots will be significant and positive; and pro­
position 4 holds that the coefficients for total govern­
ment expenditures and welfare expenditures will be signif­
icant and negative.
Each proposition will be regarded as falsified if 
either of two conditions is met: First, the regression
coefficient is statistically significant, but the sign of 
the coefficient indicates the relationship is not in the 
predicted direction. Second, the regression coefficient 
is not statistically significant. Statistical signifi­
cance will be set at the .05 level. For propositions 1,
2, and 4 the following regression model is specified.
EQ1: RM = A q + (^(RD) + 32 (PDS) + 33 <WEXP)
+ 34 (TGEXP) + 35 (BP) + e
where
RM = Riot Magnitude
JU
RD = Relative Deprivation (+)/v
PDS = Police Department Size (+)
WEXP = Welfare Expenditures (-)
TGEXP = Total Government Expenditures (-)
BP = Black Population (+)
'Pluses and minuses represent the predicted direction of 
the relationship between the variable and riot magnitude.
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To test proposition 3, which predicted a positive 
relationship between the magnitude of previous riots and 
later riots, the following model is specified.
EQ2: RM68 = A Q + ^(RD) + $2 (PDS) 4- £3 ( W E X P )
+ 3 . (TGEXP) + 3 c(BP) + 3.(PR) + e 4 D 0_____
where
RM68 = Riot Magnitude for 1968
PR = The total magnitude of prior riots from 
1964 to 1967 (+)
TABLE 9
CORRELATION MATRIX FOR EQUATION 1
RM RD PDS WEXP TGEXP BP
RM 1.0 -.07 .42 .38 .57 .64
RD 1.00 .01 - .06 -.07 -.02
PDS 1.00 .90 .93 .92
WEXP 1.00 .95 .79
TGEXP 1.00 .92
BP 1.00
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Results of Regression Analysis:
Equation 1
EQ1 : RM = -32890 + 25(RD) - .07(PDS) - 52(WEXP)
a (.18)* (3.98)*** (2.81)***
+ 12(TGEXP) + 83(BP)
(4.03)*** (1.89)**
* Not significant at the .25 level.
** Significant at the .05 level.
*** Significant at the .005 level.
R2 = .69 F = 29.6 N = 70
The scores in parentheses below the variables are the t 
scores.
As the reader can readily observe, Proposition 1, 
which predicted a positive relationship between relative 
deprivation and the magnitude of the riots, has been re­
futed. While the relationship between relative depriva­
tion and riot magnitude is in the predicted direction, it 
fails to attain statistical significance by a wide margin. 
The chances are better than one out of four that the true 
regression coefficient is 0--i.e., no relationship 
whatsoever.
Proposition 2, positing a positive relationship 
between riot magnitude and coercive force as measured by
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police department size, has also been refuted. One 
possible explanation of this finding that would be con­
sistent with proposition 2 is that, while greater police 
department size did have the specified effect of generat­
ing more hostile police-citizen encounters, when the riots 
broke out it had an even stronger effect of stifling 
violence--hence, the observed negative relationship.
This, however, is speculation, and is offered simply as 
grist for other analytic mills. It should not be con­
strued as an attempt to ’save the theory.’ In light of 
the observed negative relationships, the conclusion must 
be that proposition 2 stands as falsified.
The results for proposition 4 are mixed, though 
one might argue that, on balance, they support it. The 
relationship between riot magnitude and total government 
expenditures is significant, but is not in the predicted 
direction. On the other hand, the more direct measure of 
a city government's capacity to deal with grievances, 
welfare expenditures, is significant and is in the pre­
dicted direction.
The explanation here may be that cities with more 
serious problems of black deprivation spent more to re­
lieve it through better public services. However, except
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when channeled into the more direct measure of welfare, 
such expenditures did little good. Another approach to 
interpreting the results would be simply to forgo any 
attempt to explain the positive relationship between riot 
magnitude and total government expenditures, and to ask 
the question of which of the two variables is a more valid 
measure of a government's capacity to deal with black 
grievances. If one regards welfare expenditures as the 
more valid of the two, then proposition 4 has escaped dis- 
confirmation; if one regards total government expendi­
tures as more valid, then it has not. If neither is seen 
as valid, the question is left unresolved one way or the 
other.
TABLE 10
CORRELATION MATRIX FOR EQUATION 2
RM68 RD PDS WEXP TGEXP BP PR
RM68 1.0 -.10 .25 .34 .50 .46 .04
RD 1.00 .01 -.06 -.07 -.02 T.00
PDS 1.00 .90 .93 .92 .37
WEXP 1.00 .95 .79 .19
TGEXP 1.00 .92 .32
BP 1.00 .47
PR 1.00
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Results of Regression Analysis:
Equation 2
EQ2 : RM68 = -36203 + .06(RD) - 1.67(PDS) - 1.04(WEXP)
(.9.7)* (6.93) *** (3.11) **
+ 2.79(TGEXP) + .35(BP) - .19(PR) 
(6.30)*** (1.19)* (2.66)**
* Not significant at the .1 level.
** Significant at the .005 level.
*** Significant at the .001 level.
R2 = .76 F = 34.4 N = 69
In equation 2 the magnitude of the riots a city a
experienced in 1968 was regressed against prior riots, 
measured in terms of the magnitude of the riots that took 
place in a city during the years from 1963 to 1967. Pro­
position 3 held that the magnitude of the 1968 riot would 
be positively related to past riots, and it has been dis- 
confirmed. While the relationship is significant, as
shown in Equation 2 , it is negative rather than positive.a
One might explain this negative relationship by arguing 
that the riots a city experienced in past years took a 
sufficiently heavy toll in causalties and property damage 
to deter people from rioting again; and/or, the riots in­
duced the city government to implement social reforms that 
removed the motive for the riots.
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Further Analysis
In reporting proposition 1 on relative depriva- 
tion to have been disconfirmed no explanations were of­
fered, because none could be thought of. Considerable 
effort was expended to develop a relative deprivation 
theory that seemed to fit the social circumstances and 
experiences of blacks in the United States, and that stood 
the best chance of explaining the riots. It did not. The 
theory of relative deprivation offered in this study has 
been falsified when tested against this body of evidence.
Not as a means of rescuing the relative depriva­
tion hypothesis but merely for exploratory purposes, two 
other models were tested. They differed from Equation 1 
only in the way in which relative deprivation was defined. 
In the first model, relative deprivation was defined in 
terms of growth in median income alone. For want of a 
better term this might be called a "truncated" progres­
sive deprivation model in that no frustrating element 
analogous to perception of white-black differences is be­
ing identified. The proposition here is the loose and 
open-ended one that growth was in some way behind the 
riots, but just how this normally satisfying development
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of increasing income turned into a basis for violence is 
being left to speculation.
TABLE 11
CORRELATION MATRIX FOR EQUATION 3
RM RDG PDS WEXP TGEXP BP
RM 1.0 . 10 .42 .38 .57 .64
RDG 1.00 .03 -.002 .01 .03
PDS 1.00 .90 .93 .93
WEXP 1.00 .95 .75
TGEXP O O .92
BP 1.00
EQ3: RM = -80190 + 111.5 (RDG)+ - ,07(PDS) - 50(WEXP)
(1.11)* (4.09)**** (2.70)***
+ 12(TGEXP) + 87(BP)
(3.94)**** (2.0)**
* Not significant at the .1 level.
** Significant at the .025 level.
*** Significant at the .005 level.
**** Significant at the .001 level.
t Relative deprivation defined as growth in median 
income, 1950-1960.
R = .70 F = 30.5 N = 70
Here with Equation 3 we see that, while the rela­
tionship of relative deprivation defined as growth to
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riot magnitude is in the predicted direction, it is not 
statistically significant. The chances are better than 
one out of ten that no relationship at all exists.
A second model was tested, identical to the one 
above except that relative deprivation was defined solely 
in terms of discrimination--the white-black gap. The 
proposition here would be that prior expectations gener­
ated by growth had nothing to do with the riots. Rela­
tive deprivation was solely in terms of blacks feeling 
deprived relative to whites, and the greater the gap be­
tween the two groups, the greater the magnitude of the 
riots.
TABLE 12
CORRELATION MATRIX FOR EQUATION 4
RM RDD PDS WEXP TGEXP BP
RM 1.0 -.19 .42 .38 .58 .64
RDD 1.00 -.04 -.09 -.13 -.09
PDS 1.00 .90 .93 .92
WEXP 1.00 .95 .79
TGEXP 1.00 .92
BP 1.00
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EQ4: RM = -104 - 12(RDD)+ - .07(PDS) - 52(WEXP)
(.33)* (4.00)**** (2.85)***
+ 12(TGEXP) + 83(BP)
(4.00)**** (1.95)**
* Not significant at the .25 level.
** Significant at the .025 level.
*** Significant at the .005 level.
**** Significant at the .001 level.
t Relative deprivation defined as 
"discrimination.11
R = .70 F = 31.7 N = 74
Here again, in Equation 4, one finds no support 
for the relative deprivation variable. Not only is the 
relationship not statistically significant, it is nega­
tive rather than positive as predicted.
Summary and Conclusions
This study was conceived as means of providing a 
test of Gurr's relative deprivation theory of political 
violence. Gurr1s own test of his theory was done on a 
cross-national basis, using aggregate measures for each 
of his variables, including relative deprivation. By 
choosing a multinational sample, Gurr was forced to adopt 
a least common denominator approach to measuring relative 
deprivation; an approach that resulted in measures so
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general as to render his final results--which Gurr says 
support his relative deprivation model--equally consistent 
with a rival and more parsimonious absolute deprivation, 
or misery model.
In reaction to this, the present study proceeded 
from the premise that, if variables defined in terms of 
aggregate measures are to be used owing to problems with 
direct survey measurement of ’states of mind,' relative 
deprivation should be defined with respect to the particu­
lar pattern of conditions by which it developed. Of the 
three patterns presented by Gurr--aspirational, progres­
sive, and decremental--at least the aspirational and pro­
gressive forms are sufficiently diverse in their empiri­
cally measureable properties to allow them to be distin­
guished from the rival misery model on the basis of aggre­
gate measures alone. This implies focusing on only one 
case of political violence, which can then be closely ex­
amined to determine which pattern of relative deprivation 
was most likely involved. Using aggregate measures appo- 
priate for that pattern, one can construct statistical 
models which, when tested, will yield evidence that 
clearly corroborates or refutes the relative deprivation 
thesis.
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Following this procedure, the ghetto riots in the 
United States were singled out. A survey of previous 
studies of the riots made clear that, if relative depri­
vation was responsible for the riots, it would have been 
in the form of progressive deprivation. Gains blacks 
made in the form of increased incomes and higher educa­
tional attainments ruled out other forms, including the 
misery model. However, unlike the progressive depriva­
tion pattern specified by Gurr, the frustrating element 
for blacks was not a precipitous decline of value capa­
bilities. No evidence was encountered that incomes or 
educational attainments had dropped off before riots broke 
out. Frustration, rather, came in the form of a sudden 
change in the standards by which blacks assessed their 
value attainments. The dramatic and rapid success of the 
civil rights movement induced them to think suddenly in 
terms of equality with whites. This frustrated prior ex­
pectations , generated by growth in income and education 
during the 1950's, of achieving a satisfactory social’ 
status.
In accord with this, a regression model was con­
structed in which relative deprivation was defined as a 
product of growth in median incomes for black men between
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1950 and 1960 and the size of the gap separating black 
from white men on median income as of 1960. Three other 
varialbes--coercive force, facilitation, and governmental 
capacity--were defined and included in the regression 
model along with relative deprivation.
In light of the results obtained, the main con­
clusion is that relative deprivation did not play a role 
in inducing blacks to riot. A significant relationship 
was not found between the variables relative deprivation 
and riot magnitude.
Similarly disconfirming results were observed for 
other variables with the possible exception of government­
al capacity. That was indexed by total government expen­
ditures and by welfare expenditures. The latter did bear 
a significant relationship to ghetto riots, and, if be­
cause of its character as a more direct instrument for 
dealing with grievances, it can be regarded as a more 
valid measure of governmental capacity, then the proposi­
tion that governmental capacity is negatively related to 
the magnitude of riots has not been falsified.
One would hesitate to say that this study totally 
and conclusively refutes Gurr1s theory. If nothing else, 
methodological error can always be charged, and such
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charges must be taken especially seriously in a study 
using aggregate data to tap psychological phenomena. The 
stipulation that 'further tests are necessary,' is, alas, 
as necessary as it is trite. Ideally these tests would 
employ direct' psychological measures of hypothesized 
states of frustration and anger. However, if they are 
based on inferential aggregate measures, they should focus 
on single instances of political violence that allow for 
careful specification of the form relative deprivation 
took. In any case, pending such tests, the present study 
is offered as at least one piece of negative evidence to 
be weighed as one ponders the question of just why men 
rebel.
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